Glimpses of the Nahj al-Balaghah
- Part 2
Martyr Ayatullah Murtada Mutahhari
Translated from the Persian by 'Ali Quli Qara'i
Theology and Metaphysics
One of the fundamental issues dealt with in the Nahj al-balaghah relates
to theological and metaphysical problems. In all, there are about forty
places in the sermons, letters, and aphorisms where these matters are
discussed. Some of these pertain to the aphorisms, but more often the
discussion is longer, covering sometimes several pages.
The passages on tawhid (Divine Unity) in the Nahj al-balaghah can
perhaps be considered to be the most wonderful discussions of the book.
Without any exaggeration, when we take into account the conditions in
which they were delivered, they can almost be said to be miraculous. The
discussions on this theme in the Nahj al-balaghah are of a varied
nature. Some of them constitute studies of the scheme of creation
bearing witness to Divine creativity and wisdom.
Here, 'Ali speaks about the whole system of the heaven and the earth, or
occasionally discusses the wonderful features of some specific creature
like the bat, the peacock or the ant, and the role of Divine design and
purpose in their creation. To give an example of this kind of
discussion, we may quote a passage regarding the ant: Have you observed
the tiny creatures that He has created? How He has made them strong and
perfected their constitution and shaped their organs of hearing and
sight, and how He has styled their bones and skin? Observe the ant with
its tiny body and delicate form. It is so small that its features can
hardly be discerned by the eye and so insignificant that it does not
enter our thoughts.
See how it roams about upon the ground and arduously collects its
livelihood. It carries the grain to its hole and deposits it in its
store. It collects during the summer for the winter and, when winter
arrives, it foresees the time to reemerge. Its livelihood is guaranteed
and designed according to its built. The Benefactor and the Provider
does not forget or forsake it. He does not deprive it, even though it
should be in hard and dry stones and rocks. You will be amazed at the
delicate intricacy of its wonderful constitution if you investigate the
structure of its alimentary canals, its belly, and its eyes and ears
which are in its head ... (Sermon 185)
However, most of the discussions about tawhid in the Nahj al-balaghah
are rational and philosophical. The rare sublimity of the Nahj al-balaghah
becomes manifest in these discourses. In these philosophical and
rational discourses of the Nahj al-balaghah on tawhid what constitutes
the focus of all arguments is the infinite, absolute and self-sufficing
nature of the Divine Essence. In these passages, 'Ali ('a) attains to
the heights of eloquence, and none, neither before him nor after him,
has approached him in this aspect.
Another issue dealt with is that of the absolute simplicity (al-basatatal-mutlaqah)
of the Divine Essence and negation of every kind of multiplicity,
divisibility in the Godhead and refutation of separability of the Divine
Attributes from the Divine Essence. This theme occurs repeatedly in the
Nahj al-balaghah. Also discussed is a series of other profound problems
which had never been touched before him. They are: God being the First
while also being the Last; His being simultaneously the Manifest and the
Hidden; His priority over time and number, i.e. His pre-eternity is not
temporal and His Unity is not numerical; His Supremacy, Authority, and
Self-sufficiency;
His Creativeness; that attendance to one affair does not prevent Him
from attending to other affairs; the identity of Divine Word and Act;
the limited capacity of human reason to comprehend His reality; that
gnosis (ma'rifah) is a kind of manifestation (tajalli) of Him upon the
intellects, which is different from conception or cognition by the mind;
the negation of such categories and qualities as corporeality, motion,
rest, change, place, time, similarity, opposition, partnership,
possession of organs or instruments, limitation and number; and a series
of other issues which we shall, God willing, mention later and give
examples of every one of these. Even a thinker well-versed in the
beliefs and views of ancient and modern philosophers would be struck
with wonder to see the wide range and scope of the problems propounded
in that wonderful book.
An elaborate discussion of the issues raised and dealt with in the Nahj
al-balaghah would itself require a voluminous book and cannot be covered
in one or two articles. Unavoidably, we shall be brief; but before we
commence our brief survey, we are compelled to mention certain points as
an introduction to our discussion.
A Bitter Fact:
We, the Shi'ah Muslims, must confess that we have been unjust in regard
to our duty with respect to the man whom we, more than others, take
pride in following; or, at the very least, we must admit falling short
in our duty towards him. In substance, any kind of failure in fulfilling
our responsibility is an act of injustice on our part. We did not want
to realize the significance of 'Ali ('a), or we had been unable to. All
our energy and labour were devoted to proclaiming the Prophet's
statements about 'Ali and to denouncing those who ignored them, but we
failed to pay attention to the intellectual side of Imam 'Ali's
personality.
Sadi says: The reality of musk lies in its scent, Not in the perfumer's
advice. Applying Sa'di's words to our attitude regarding Imam 'Ali's
personality, we did not realize that this musk, recommended by the
Divine Perfumer, itself carried its pleasant aroma, and before
everything else we should have tried to know its scent and become
familiar with it. That is, we should have familiarized ourselves and
others with its inner fragrance.
The counsel of the Divine Perfumer was meant to acquaint the people with
its pleasant redolence, not for the purpose that they may believe that
it is musk and then devote all their energies trying to convince others
by arguing with them, without bothering to acquaint themselves with its
real fragrance. Had the Nahj al-balaghah belonged to some other people,
would they have treated it in the way we treated this great book? The
country of Iran is the centre of Shi'ism and the language of its people
is Persian. You have only to examine the translations and commentaries
on the Nahj al-balaghah to make a judgement about what our
accomplishment amounts to.
To take a more general case, the Shi'i sources of hadith (tradition) and
texts of du'a' (prayers) are incomparable to the texts of the non-Shi'i
works in the same field. This is also true of Divine teachings and other
subjects. The problems and issues discussed in works like al-Kulayni's
al-Kafi, or al-Shaykh al-Saduq's al-Tawhid, or al-'Ihtijaj of al-Tabarsi
are nowhere to be found among the works of the non-Shi'is.
It can be said that if occasionally similar issues are dealt with in the
non-Shi'i books, the material is unmistakably spurious, for it is not
only opposed to the prophetic teachings but is also contradictory to the
Quranic fundamentals. There is a strong smell of anthropomorphism which
hangs around them. Recently, Hashim Ma'ruf al-Hasani, in his book
Dirasat fi al-Kafi li al-Kulayni wa al-Sahih li al-Bukhari, which is an
original but a brief comparative study of al-Sahih of al-Bukhari and al-Kulayni's
al-Kafi, has dealt with the traditions related to the problems of
theology.
Shi'i Rationalism:
The discussion of theological problems and their analysis by the Shi'i
Imams, of which the Nahj al-balaghah is the earliest example, was the
main cause of the emergence of rationalistic approach and philosophic
outlook in the Shi'i intellectual world from the earliest days of Islam.
This cannot be labelled as an innovation in Islam; rather, its basis was
laid down by the Quran itself. It was in accordance with the approach of
the Quran and for the purpose of its interpretation that the Imams of
the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) expounded such issues.
If anybody can be reproached in this matter, it is those who did not
adopt this method and abandoned the means to follow it. History shows
that from the earliest Islamic era, the Shiah, more than any other sect,
were interested in these problems. Amongst the Ahl al-Sunnah, the
Mu'tazilites, who were nearer to the Shi'ah, did possess similar
inclinations. But, as we know, the general view predominant among the
Ahl al-Sunnah did not welcome it, and as a result the Mu'tazilite sect
became extinct about the end of the 3rd/9th century .
Ahmad Amin, the Egyptian writer, confirms this view in the first volume
of his Zuhr al-'Islam. After discussing the philosophic movement in
Egypt during the reign of the Fatimids, who were a Shi'ah sect, he
writes: Philosophy is more akin to Shi'ism than it is to the Sunni
Islam, and we witness the truth of this in the era of the Fatimid rule
[in Egypt] and in that of the Buyids [in Iran]. Even during the later
ages Iran, which is a Shi'ite country, has paid more attention to
philosophy than any other Islamic country. In our own times, Sayyid
Jamal al-Din al Asadabadi, who had Shi'ite inclinations and had studied
philosophy in Iran, created a philosophic movement in Egypt when he
arrived here. Curiously, Ahmad Amin in his explanation of why the Shi'ah
showed more inclination towards philosophy, commits an error, willfully
or otherwise.
According to him, "the reason for greater inclination on the part of the
Shi'ah towards rational and philosophical discussions is to be found in
their esotericism and their flair for ta'wil. [1] They were compelled to
seek the assistance of philosophy for defence of their esotericism. That
is why the Fatimid Egypt and Buyid Persia, and Iran during the Safawid
and Qajar periods, were more disposed towards philosophy than the rest
of the Islamic world." This is sheer nonsense on the part of Ahmad Amin.
It was the Imams ('a) of the Shi'ah who for the first time introduced
philosophical approach, and it was they who introduced the most profound
and intricate concepts with regard to theological problems in their
arguments, polemics, sermons, ahadith, and prayers, of which the Nahj
al-balaghah is one example. Even with regard to the prophetic
traditions, the Shi'ah sources are far more sublime and profound than
the traditions contained in the non-Shi'i sources. This characteristic
is not confined to philosophy only, but is also true of kalam, fiqh, and
usul al-fiqh, in which the Shi'ah enjoy a position of distinction. All
this owes its origin to one and same source: stress on rationalism.
Some others have tried to trace the origin of this difference [between
the Shi'i and the Sunni intellects] in the concept of "the Shi'ite
nation". According to them, since the Persians are Shi'ite and the
Shi'ah are Persian, and as the Persians are a people with a
philosophical temperament, fond of the intricacies of speculation and
pure thought, with the help of their rich and strong philosophical
tradition, they succeeded in raising the level of Shi'a thought and gave
it an Islamic colour.
Bertrand Russell, in A History of Western Philosophy, expresses a
similar view based on the above-mentioned argument. With his habitual or
inherent impoliteness he puts forth this opinion. However, Russell lacks
the capacity of vindicating his claim, since he was totally unfamiliar
with Islamic philosophy and basically knew nothing about it. He was not
qualified to express any informed opinion about the origins of Shi'ah
thought and its sources. Our rejoinder to the upholders of this view is:
first of all, not all Shi'ah were Iranian, nor all Iranians were Shi'ah.
Were Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni, Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn al-Husayn ibn
Babawayh al- Qummi and Muhammad ibn Abi Talib al-Mazandarani Persian,
but not Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari, Abu Dawud al-Sijistani and
Muslim ibn Hajjaj al-Nishaburi? Was al-Sayyid al-Radi, the compiler of
the Nahj al-balaghah, of Persian origin? Were the Fatimids of Egypt of
Persian descent?
Why was philosophic thought revived in Egypt with the inception of
Fatimid rule and why did it decline with their fall? And why was it
revived later, after a long interval, only through the influence of an
Iranian Shi'ah? The truth is that the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) were
the only real dynamic force behind this mode of thinking and this kind
of approach. All scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah admit that among the
Prophet's Companions only 'Ali ('a) was a man of philosophic wisdom, who
had an altogether distinct rational approach. Abu 'Ali ibn Sina is
quoted as having remarked: 'Ali's position among the Companions of
Muhammad (S), was that of the "rational" in the midst of the
"corporeal."
Obviously, the intellectual approach of the followers of such an Imam as
'Ali ('a) should be expected to be radically different from that of
those who followed others. Moreover, Ahmad Amin and others have been
susceptible to another similar misunderstanding. They express doubts
with regard to the authenticity of ascription of such philosophic
statements [as exist in the Nahj al-balaghah ] to 'Ali ('a).
They say that the Arabs were not familiar with such kind of issues and
such arguments and elaborate analyses as are found in the Nahj al-balaghah
before their acquaintance with Greek philosophy, and evidently,
according to them, these discourses should have been composed by some
later scholars familiar with Greek philosophy, and were attributed to
Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib ('a). We also accept that the Arabs were not
familiar with such ideas and notions.
Not only the Arabs, the non-Arabs, too, were not acquainted with them,
nor were those notions familiar to the Greeks and Greek philosophy.
Ahmad Amin first brings down 'Ali ('a) to the level of such Arabs like
Abu Jahl and Abu Sufyan and then he postulates his minor and major
premises and bases his conclusion on them: The Arabs were unfamiliar
with philosophical notions; 'Ali was an Arab: therefore 'Ali was also
unfamiliar with philosophical notions.
One should ask him whether the Arabs of the Jahiliyyah were familiar
with the ideas and concepts that were propounded in the Quran. Had not
'Ali ('a) been brought up and trained by the Messenger of Allah himself?
Didn't the Prophet (S) introduce 'Ali ('a) to his Companions as the most
learned and knowledgeable amongst them? Why should we deny the high
spiritual status of someone who enriched his inner self by drawing on
the bounteous wealth of Islam in order to protect the prestige of some
of the Prophet's Companions who could never rise above the ordinary
level? Ahmad Amin says that before acquaintance with Greek philosophy
the people of Arabia were not familiar with the ideas and concepts found
in the Nahj al-balaghah.
The answer to this is that the Arabs did not become acquainted with the
ideas and notions propounded in the Nahj al-balaghah even after
centuries of familiarity with Greek philosophy. Not only the Arabs, even
the non-Arab Muslims were not acquainted with these ideas, for the
simple reason that there is no trace of them in Greek philosophy itself!
These ideas are exclusively special to Islamic philosophy. The Islamic
philosophers gradually picked these ideas up from the basic Islamic
sources and incorporated them in their thought under the guidance of
revelation.
Philosophical Notions Concerning Metaphysics
As mentioned before, the Nahj al-balaghah adopts two kinds of approach
to the problems of theology. The first kind of approach calls attention
to the sensible world and its phenomena as a mirror reflecting the
Knowledge and Perfection of the Creator. The second approach involves
purely rationalistic and philosophical reflections. The latter approach
accounts for the greater part of the theological discussions of the Nahj
al-balaghah. Moreover, it is the only approach adopted in regard to the
discussion about the Divine Essence and Attributes.
As we know, the value of such discussions and the legitimacy of such
reflections have been always questioned by those who consider them
improper from the viewpoint of reason or canon, or both. In our own
times, a certain group claims that this kind of analysis and inference
does not agree with the spirit of Islam and that the Muslims were
initiated into such kind of speculations under the influence of Greek
philosophy and not as a result of any inspiration or guidance effused
from the Quran. They say that if the Muslims had adhered closely to the
Quranic teachings they would not have entangled themselves with these
tortuous clebates.
For the same reason, they view with suspicion the authenticity of such
speculations found in the Nahj al-balaghah and their ascription to Imam
'Ali ('a). In the second and third centuries a group of people opposed
such kind of discussions and questioned their legitimacy, raising
doctrinal objections. They insisted that it is obligatory for Muslims to
be satisfied with the literal and commonly understood meaning of the
words of the Quran, and regarded every kind of inquiry into the meaning
of the Quran as an innovation (bid'ah) in religion. For instance, if
someone inquired about the meaning of the Quranic verse "The
All-compassionate sat Himself upon the Throne " [20:5], he was
confronted by the displeasure of those who regarded such questions as
not only improper but distasteful. He would be told: "The exact meaning
is unknown and questioning is heresy". [2]
During the 3rd/9th century, this group, which later came to be called
Ash'arites, overwhelmed the Mu'tazilites, who considered such
speculations to be within the bounds of legitimacy. This victory of the
Asharites delivered a severe blow to the intellectual life of Islam. The
Akhbaris, who were a Shi'i school which flourished during the period
between the 10th/16th and the 14th/20th centuries-and particularly
during the 10th/16th and 11th/17th centuries-followed the Asha'irah in
their ideas and beliefs. They raised doctrinal objections against
ratiocination.
Now we shall proceed to discuss the objections raised from a rationalist
point of view. As a result of the triumph of the empirical and
experimental method over the deductive approach in Europe, especially in
the physical sciences, the view began to prevail that rational
speculation was unreliable not only in the physical sciences but also in
all scientific disciplines and that the only reliable method was that of
empirical philosophy.
The result of it was that tne problems of theology were viewed with
doubt and suspicion, because they lay beyond the domain of experimental
and empirical observation. The past victories of the Ash'arites, on the
one hand, and the amazing triumphs of the empirical method, which
followed one another in quick succession, on the other hand, drove some
non-Shi'ite Muslim writers to the extremes of excitement.
The outcome was the eclectic opinion that from the religious (Shar'i) as
well as the rational point of view the use of deductive method even in
problems of theology should be discarded. From the Shar'i viewpoint,
they made the claim that according to the outlook of the Quran the only
approach valid in theology was the empirical and experimental method and
the study of the natural phenomena and the system of creation; the rest,
they declared, is no more than an exercise in futility.
They pointed out that in scores of its verses, the Quran in most
unequivocal terms has invited human beings to study the phenomena of
nature; it considers the keys to the secrets of the origin and workings
of the universe to be concealed within nature itself. In this way they
echoed, in their writings and speeches, the ideas expressed by the
European proponents of empirical philosophy .
Farid al-Wajdi in his book 'Ala atlal al-madhhab al-maddi (On the Ruins
of Materialism), and Sayyid Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi, in his Madha khasira
al-'alam bi-inhitat al-Muslimin ("What the World Lost Through the
Decline of Muslims") and the writers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood
(Ikhwan al-Muslimin) such as Sayyid Qutb and others, have supported this
view, vehemently attacking the opposite viewpoint.
Al-Nadawi, in his above-mentioned book, says: The prophets informed men
about the existence of God and His Attributes and informed them about
the origin and beginning of the world and the ultimate destiny of man,
putting this free information at his disposal. They relieved him of the
need to understand and discuss these problems the basics of which lie
beyond our reach (because these problems belong to the sphere of the
supra-sensible and our knowledge and experience is limited to the
physical and the sensible). But men did not value this blessing and
entangled themselves in debates and speculations about these problems,
and strode into the dark regions of the hidden and the unknowable. [3]
The same author, in another chapter of the same book, where he discusses
the causes of the decline of Muslims, under the heading "The Neglect of
Useful Sciences," criticizes the muslim 'ulama' in these words: The
Muslim scholars and thinkers did not give as much importance to
practical and experimental sciences as they gave to debating about
metaphysics, which they had learnt from Greek philosophy. The Greek
metaphysics and theology is nothing more than Greek's polytheistic
mythology presented in a philosophical outfit, and is no more than a
series of meaningless conjectures expressed in an absurd jargon. God has
exempted Muslims from debate, speculation and analysis in these matters,
which are not much different from the analytic pursuits of the
Alchemists. But out of ingratitude for this great blessing, the Muslims
wasted their energy and genius in problems of this sort. [4]
Without doubt, the views of the like of Farid al-Wajd; and al-Nadawi
should be regarded as a kind of return to Ash'arism, though dressed in
contemporary style akin to the language of empirical philosophy. Here,
we cannot enter into a philosophic discussion about the value of
philosophic reflection. In the chapters entitled "The Value of
Information" and "Origin of Multiplicity in Perception" of the book The
Principles and Method of Realism, we have discussed the matter in
sufficient detail.
Here, we shall confine ourselves to the Quranic aspect of this problem,
and investigate whether the Holy Quran considers the study of nature to
be the only valid method of inquiry into theological problems, or
whether it allows for another approach besides the above-mentioned.
However, it is essential to point out that the disagreement between the
Ash'arites and the non-Ash'arites is not about the legitimacy of the use
of the Book and the Sunnah as sources in the problems of theology;
rather, the disagreement concerns the manner of their utilization.
According to the Ash'arites, their application should not exceed mute
acceptance. According to them, we assign the various Attributes like
Unity, Omniscience, Omnipotence and the rest to God because they have
been ascribed to Him by the Shar'iah, otherwise we would not know
whether God is such or not, because the basic principles and essentials
dealing with God are beyond our reach.
Therefore, according to them, we are forced to accept God as such, but
we cannot know or understand that God is such. The role of the religious
texts is that they prescribe for us the way we ought to think and
believe so that we may follow it in our thought and beliefs. According
to the contestants of this view, these issues are amenable to human
understanding, like any other rational concept or idea. That is, there
exist certain principles and essentials which if known properly enable
man to understand them. The role of the religious texts lies in their
capacity to inspire, motivate, and guide human reason by putting
understandable principles and essentials at its disposal.
Basically servitude in intellectual matters is absurd. It is like
ordering one to think in a certain fashion, and asking him to derive
certain prescribed conclusions. It is like ordering someone to see a
thing in a certain fashion and then asking him, "How do you see it? Is
it big or small? black or white?" Servitude in thinking does not mean
anything other than absence of thinking and acceptance without
reflection. In short, the question is not whether it is possible for man
to go beyond the teachings of the Revelation. God be our refuge, there
is nothing that lies beyond them; because that which has reached us
through Revelation and the Household of the Revelation (i.e. the Ahl
al-Bayt [A]) is the utmost limit of perfection concerning knowledge of
the Divine. Here our debate centres upon the capacity of human thought
and reason, whether it can, when supplied with the basic principles and
essentials, undertake an intellectual journey through the world of
theological problems [5] or not.
As to the invitation of the Quran to study and inquiry about the
phenomena of creation, and its emphasis on nature as a means for
attaining the knowledge of God and the supra-natural, it should be said
that it is, indubitably, a basic principle of the Quranic teachings. It
is with extraordinary insistence that the Quran asks human beings to
inquire into the nature of the earth, the sky, the plants and animals,
and man himself, and urges them to study them scientifically. It is also
indubitable that the Muslims did not take enough worthy steps in this
direction. Perhaps the real reason behind it was Greek philosophy, which
was deductive and based on pure speculation, and they used this approach
even in the field of the physical sciences.
Nevertheless, as the history of science bears testimony, the muslim
scientists did not altogether abandon the experimental method in their
studies like the Greeks. The Muslims were the pioneers of the
experimental method, not the Europeans, as is commonly thought, who
followed on the tracks first laid by the Muslims.
The Value of Study of the Natural Phenomena:
Aside from all of this, the question worthy of consideration is whether
the Quran, besides its emphasis on the study of the creatures of earth,
water, and air, allows other ways of approaching the issue, or if it
closes all other doors. The question is whether the Quran, even as it
invites people to study the signs of God (ayat), also welcomes other
modes of intellectual endeavour. Basically, what is the value of inquiry
into the works of creation (an inquiry which the Quran urges us,
explicitly or implicitly, to undertake), from the viewpoint of
initiating us into the awareness and consciousness which this heavenly
Book aims to cultivate?
The truth is that the measure of assistance provided by the study of the
works of the creation in understanding the problems explicitly pointed
out by the Holy Quran is quite restricted. The Quran has propounded
certain problems of theology which are by no means understandable
through the study of the created world or nature. The value of study of
the system of creation is limited only to the extent to which it proves
that the world is governed by a Power which knows, designs, plans, and
administers it.
The world is a mirror, open to empirical experiment, only to the extent
that it points towards something that lies beyond nature and discloses
the existence of a Mighty Hand which runs nature's cosmic wheels. But
the Quran is not content that man should only know that a Mighty,
Knowing, and Wise Power administers this universe. This may perhaps be
true of other heavenly scriptures, but is by no means true of the Holy
Quran, which is the final and ultimate heavenly message and has a great
deal to say about God and the reality transcending nature.
Purely Rationalistic Problems:
The most basic problem to which the mere study of the world of creation
fails to provide an answer is the necessity of existence and
uncreatedness of the Power which transcends nature. The world is a
mirror in the sense that it indicates the existence of a Mighty Hand and
a Wise Power, but it does not tell us anything more about Its nature. It
does not tell us whether that Power is subservient to something else or
not, or if it is self-subsisting. And if it is subject to something
else, what is that?
The objective of the Quran is not only that we should know that a Mighty
Hand administers the world, but that we may know that that Administrator
is "Allah" and that "Allah" is the indefinable: (There is nothing like
Him), whose Essence encompasses all perfection, or in other words, that
"Allah" signifies Absolute Perfection and is the referent of, (His is
the loftiest likeness). How can the study of nature give us an
understanding of such notions and concepts? The second problem is that
of the Unity of God. The Quran has stated this issue in a logical form
and used a syllogistic argument to explain it. The method of argument it
has employed in this regard is what is called 'exclusive syllogism' or 'reductio
ad impossible' (burhan al-tamanu'). On occasion it eliminates the
possibility of multiplicity in the efficient cause as in the following
verse: [6]
If there had been (multiple) gods in them (i.e. the earth and the
heaven) other than God, they would surely go to ruin ... (21:22) At
other times it argues by eliminating the possibility of multiplicity in
the final cause: God has not taken to Himself any son, nor is there any
god besides Him; for then each god would have taken off that he created
and some of them would have risen up over others ... (23:91)
The Quran never suggests that the study of the system of creation can
lead us to the knowledge of the Unity of the Godhead so as to imply that
the essential knowledge of the transcendental Creator be considered
attainable from that source. Moreover, such a suggestion would not have
been correct. The Quran alludes to various problems as indicated by the
following examples:
No thing is like Him ... (42:11) And God's is the loftiest likeness ...
(16:60) To Him belong the Names most Beautiful. (20:8) And His is the
loftiest likeness in the heavens and the earth ... (30:27) He is God,
there is no god but He. He is the King, the All-holy, the All-peaceable.
the All-faithful, the All-preserver, the All-mighty, the All-compeller,
the All-sublime ... (59:23) And to God belong the East and the West;
whither so ever you turn, there is the Face of God ... (2:115) And He is
God in the heavens and the earth; He knows your secrets, and what you
publish ... (6:3) He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the
Inward; He has knowledge of everything. (57:3) He is the Living, the
Everlasting ... (2:255) God, is the Everlasting, [Who] has not begotten,
and has not been begotten and equal to Him is not any one. (112:2-4)
Why does the Quran raise such issues? Is it for the sake of propounding
mysterious matters incomprehensible to man, who, according to al-Nadawi,
lacks the knowledge of its essential principles, and then asking him to
accept them without comprehending their meaning? Or, the Quran actually
does want him to know God through the attributes and descriptions that
have come in it? And, if this is true, what reliable approach does it
recommend? How is it possible to acquire this knowledge through the
study of the natural phenomena? The study of the creation teaches us
that God has knowledge of the things; that is, the things that He has
made were created knowingly and wisely. But the Quran expects us not
only to know this, but also stresses that:
Indeed God has the knowledge of everything. (2:231) And not so much as
the weight of an atom in earth or heaven escapes from thy Lord, neither
is aught smaller than that, or greater, but in a Manifest Book. (10:61)
Say: "If the sea were ink for the Words of my Lord, the sea would be
spent before the Words of my Lord are spent, though We brought
replenishment the like of it. " (18:109)
This means that God's knowledge is infinite and so is His power. How and
wherefore is it possible through perception and observation of the world
of creation to reach the conclusion that the Creator's Knowledge and
Power are infinite? The Quran, similarly, propounds numerous other
problems of the kind. For instance, it mentions al-lawh al-mahfuz (the
Protected Tablet), lawh al-mahw wa al-'ithbat (The Tablet of Expunction
and Affirmation), jabr and ikhtiyar (determinism and free will), wahy
(revelation) and ilham (intuition), etc.; none of which are susceptible
to inquiry through the empirical study of the world of creation. It must
be admitted that the Quran, definitely, has raised these problems in the
form of a series of lessons and has emphasized their importance through
advice and exhortation. The following verses of the Quran may be quoted
in this connection:
What, do they not meditate in the Quran? Or is it that there are locks
upon their hearts? .... (47:24) (This is) a Scripture that We have
revealed unto thee, full of blessing, that they may ponder its
revelations, and that men of understanding may reflect. (38:29
Inevitably, we are forced to accept that the Quran assumes the existence
of a reliable method for understanding the meaning of these truths,
which have not been revealed as a series of obscure incomprehensibles
which lie beyond the reach of the human mind. The scope of problems
propounded by the Quran in the sphere of metaphysics is far greater than
what can be resolved or be answered through the study of physical
creation. This is the reason why the Muslims have pursued these
problems, at times through spiritual and gnostic efforts, and at other
times through speculative and rational approach.
I wonder whether those who claim that the Quran considers the study of
nature as the sole, sufficient means for the solution of metaphysical
problems, can give a satisfying answer in regard to the multifarious
problems propounded by it, a characteristic which is special to this
great heavenly Book. 'Ali's sole source of inspiration in his exposition
of the problems mentioned in the previous chapters is the Holy Quran,
and the sole motive behind his discourses is exegetical. Perhaps, had it
not been for 'Ali ('a) the rationalistic and speculative aspects of the
Quran would have forever remained uninterpreted. After these brief
introductory remarks on the value of these issues, we shall go on to
cite some relevant examples from the Nahj al-balaghah.
The Divine Essence and Attributes:
In this section we shall cite some examples of the Nahj al-balaghah's
treatment of the problems of theology related with Divine Essence and
Attributes. Later we shall make a brief comparative study of the issue
in various schools and conclude our discussion on this aspect of the
Nahj al-balaghah. However, before proceeding further, I ask for the
reader's pardon that the discussion in the last three sections became a
bit technical and philosophical, which is not very welcome for those not
used to it. But what is the remedy? Discussion on a book such as the
Nahj al-balaghah does entail such ups and downs. For this reason, we
shall limit ourselves to giving only a few examples from the book on
this subject, and refrain from any elaborate discussion. Because, if we
were to comment on every sentence of the Nahj al-balaghah, the result
will be, as is said: My mathnawi requires seventy maunds of paper.
The Divine Essence:
Does the Nahj al-balaghah have anything to say about the Divine Essence
and how to define it? The answer is, Yes, and a lot. However, much of
the discussion revolves around the point that the Divine Essence is
Absolute and Infinite Being, without a quiddity. His Essence accepts no
limits and boundaries like other beings, static or changeable, which are
limited and finite. A changeable being is one which constantly
transcends its former limits and assumes new ones. But such is not the
Divine Essence. Quiddity, which may qualify and confine Him within
limits of finitude, is not applicable to Him.
None of the aspects of being are devoid of His Presence, and no kind of
imperfection is appllicable to Him, except absence of any imperfection
whatsoever: the only thing amiss in Him is absence of defect or
inadequacy of any kind. The sole kind of negation applicable to Him is
the negation of all negations. The only kind of non-being attributable
to Him is the negation of any kind of imperfection in relation to Him.
He is free from all shades of non-being which characterize the creatures
and effects. He is free from finitude, multiplicity, divisibility, and
need. The only territory that He does not enter is that of nothingness
and non-being. He is with every thing, but not in any thing, and nothing
is with Him. He is not within things, though not out of them. He is over
and above every kind of condition, state, similarity, and likeness. For,
these qualities relate to limited and determinate beings characterized
by quiddity: He is with everything but not in the sense of [physical]
nearness. He is different from every thing but not in the sense of
separation. (Sermon 1 ) He is not inside things in the sense of physical
[pervasion or] penetration, and is not outside them in the sense of
[physical] exclusion [for exclusion entails a kind of finitude]. (Sermon
186)
He is distinct from things because He overpowers them, and the things
are distinct from Him because of their subjection to Him. (Sermon 152)
That is, His distinctness from things lies in the fact that He has
authority and control over them. However, His power, authority and
sovereignty, unlike that of the creatures, is not accompanied with
simultaneous weakness, subjugation, and subjection. His distinction and
separateness from things lies in the fact that things are totally
subject to His power and authority, and that which is subject and
subordinated can never be like the one who subjugates and commands
control over it. His separateness from things does not lie in physical
separation but is on account of the distinction which lies between the
Provider and the provided, the Perfect and the imperfect, the Powerful
and the weak. These kind of ideas are replete in 'Ali's discourses. All
the problems which shall be discussed later are based on the principle
that Divine Essence is Absolute and Infinite, and the concepts of limit,
form and condition do not apply to it.
Divine Unity an Ontological, not a Numerical Concept:
Another feature of tawhid (monotheism) as propounded by the Nahj al-balaghah
is that Divine Unity is not numerical, but something else. Numerical
unity means the oneness of something which has possibility of
recurrence. It is always possible to imagine that the quiddity and form
of an existent is realizable in another individual being. In such cases,
the unity of an individual possessing that quiddity is numerical oneness
and stands in opposition to duplicity or multiplicity.
'It is one,' means that there is not another like it, and inevitably
this kind of unity entails the quality of being restricted in number,
which is a defect; because one is lesser in number as compared to two or
more of its kind. But, if a being be such that assumption of recurrence
with regard to it is impossible, since it is infinite and unlimited, and
if we assume another like it to exist, it will follow that it is the
same as the first being or that it is something which is not similar to
it and therefore cannot be called a second instance of it. In such a
case, unity is not numerical.
That is, this kind of unity is not one opposed to duplicity or
multiplicity, and when it is said 'It is one,' it does not mean that
'there are not two, three or more of its kind,' but it means that a
second to it is unconceivable. This notion can further be clarified
through an example. We know that the astronomers and physicists are not
in agreement about the dimensions of the universe, whether it is limited
in size or infinite. Some scientists have favoured the idea of an
unlimited and infinite universe; others claim that the universe is
limited in dimensions so that if we travel in any direction, we shall
reach a point beyond which there is no space. The other issue is whether
the universe in which we live is the only universe in existence, or if
there are other universes existing besides it.
Evidently, the assumption of another physical world beyond our own is a
corollary to the assumption that our universe is not infinite. Only in
this case it is possible to assume the existence of, say, two physical
universes each of which is limited and has finite dimensions. But if we
assume that our universe is infinite, it is not possible to entertain
the assumption of another universe existing beyond it. For, whatever we
were to assume would be identical with this universe or a part of it.
The assumption of another being similar to the Being of the One God-like
the assumption of another physical universe besides an infinite material
universe-amounts to assuming the impossible, for the Being of God is
absolute: Absolute Selfhood and Absolute Reality. The notion that Divine
Unity is not a numerical concept, and that qualifying it by a number is
synonymous with imposing limits on the Divine Essence, is repeatedly
discussed by the Nahj al-balaghah: He is the One, but not in a numerical
sense. (Sermon 152) He is not confined by limits nor counted by numbers.
(Sermon 186) He who points to Him, admits for Him limitations; and he
who admits limitations for Him has numbered Him. (Sermon 1) He who
qualifies Him limits Him. He who limits Him numbers Him. He who numbers
Him denies His pre-eternity. (Sermon 152) Everything associated with
unity is deficient except Him. (Sermon 65) How beautiful, profound, and
full of meaning is the last sentence. It states that everything except
the Divine Essence is limited if it is one. That is, every thing for
which another of its kind is conceivable is a limited being and an
addition of another individual would increase its number.
But this is not true of the Unity of the Divine Essence; for God's Unity
lies in His greatness and infinity, for which a like, a second, an equal
or a match is not conceivable. This concept that Divine Unity is not a
numerical notion is exclusively an Islamic concept, original and
profound, and unprecedented in any other school of thought. Even the
Muslim philosophers only gradually realized its profundity through
contemplating the spirit of the original Islamic texts and in particular
the discourses of 'Ali ('a), and ultimately formally incorporated it in
the Islamic metaphysical philosophy. There is no trace of this profound
concept in the writings of the early Islamic philosophers like al Farabi
and Ibn Sina. Only the later philosophers ushered this concept into
their philosophic thinking calling it "Really True Unity," in their
terminology.
God, The First and the Last; the Manifest and the Hidden:
Of the many issues discussed by the Nahj al-balaghah is the notion that
God is the First and the Last, the Hidden and the Manifest. Of course
this, too, like other notions, has been deduced from the Holy Quran;
though here we are not going to quote the verses from the Quran. God is
the First, but His precedence is not temporal so as to be in
contradiction with His being the Last. He is the Manifest, but not in
the sense of being physically visible or perceptible to the senses; His
Manifestness does not contradict His Hiddenness. In fact His Firstness
is identical with His Lastness and similarly His Manifestness and
Hiddenness are identical; they are not two different things: Praise be
to Allah, for whom one condition does not precede another, so that He
may he the First before being the Last or may be Manifest before being
Hidden ... (Sermon 65)
Time is not His accomplice, nor does He need the assistance of tools and
agents His Being transcends time. His Existence transcends nothingness
and His pre-eternity transcends all beginning. (Sermon 186) The Divine
Essence's transcendence over time, nothingness, beginning, and end is
one of the most profound concepts of al-hikmah philosophy. God's
pre-eternity does not mean that God has always existed.
Certainly God has always existed but Divine pre-eternity (azaliyyah) is
something greater in meaning than 'existence at all times'; because,
'existing at all times' assumes existence in time; but God's Being has
not only been at all times, It precedes time itself. This is the meaning
of Divine pre-eternity. This shows that His precedence is something
other than temporal precedence. Praise be to God, whose creation bears
testimony to His Existence; temporality (huduth) of whose creation is
the evidence of His preternity the similarity and likeness amongst whose
creation proves that He is unique. The senses do not perceive Him and
nothing can conceal Him. (Sermon 152)
That is, God is both Hidden and Manifest. By Himself He is Manifest but
is Hidden from the human senses. His Hiddenness from the senses is due
to man's own limitations and not on account of Him. It needs no proof
that existence is synonymous with manifestation; the more powerful the
existence of a being, the more manifest it would be. Conversely, the
weaker its being is and the more intermingled it is with non-being, the
less manifest it is to itself and others. For everything, there are two
modes of being: its being-in-itself (wujud fi nagsih), and its
being-for-others.
The being of every thing for us depends upon the structure of our senses
and certain special conditions. Accordingly, the manifestation of a
thing is also of two kinds: its manifestation-in-itself (zuhur fi nafsih)
and its manifestation-for-others. Our senses, on account of their
limitations, are able to perceive only a limited number of finite
objects possessing the characteristics of similarity and opposition. The
senses can perceive colours, shapes, sounds, etc., which are limited
temporally and spacially; that is, their existence is confined within a
particular time and place. Now if there existed a uniform light, always
and everywhere, it would not be perceptible.
A continuous monotonous sound heard always and everywhere would not be
audible. The Being of God, which is absolute being and absolute reality,
is not confined to any particular time and place, and is hidden from our
senses. But God in Himself is absolutely manifest; the perfection of His
manifestness, which follows from the perfection of His Being, is itself
the cause of His hiddenness from our senses. The two aspects of His
manifestness and hiddenness are one and the same in His Essence. He is
hidden because He is perfectly manifest, and this perfect manifestness
conceals Him. Thou, who art hidden on account of Thy perfect brilliance,
Thou Art the Manifest, hidden in Thy manifestness. The veil on Thy face
is also Thy face, So manifest Thou art, Thy manifestness conceals Thee
from the world's eyes.
An Appraisal
An appraisal however brief of the approach of the Nahj al-balaghah and
its comparison with that of other schools of thought is essential for
discovering the true worth of its views on the problems of theology. We
shall confine ourselves to the brief, though not quite sufficient,
examples quoted in the foregoing pages and proceed to evaluate them. The
subject of the Divine Essence and Attributes is one which has been
discussed a lot by the ancient and modern philosophers, mystics and
Sufis of the East and the West. But in general their method and approach
is totally different from that of the Nahj al-balaghah, whose approach
is highly original and unprecedented. Only in the Holy Quran can be
found a precedent for the Nahj al-balaghah.
Apart from the Holy Quran, we do not find any other source that provides
some ground for the discourses of the Nahj al-balaghah. As pointed out
earlier, some scholars, because of their failure to trace back to some
earlier source the notions elaborated in the Nahj al-balaghah, have
questioned the authenticity of ascription of these discourses to 'Ali
('a). They have supposed that these discourses appeared in a later
period, after the appearance of the Mu'tazilites and assimilation of
Greek thought, heedless of the saying: The mean earth with the sublime
heaven does not compare! What ignorance to compare the Mu'tazilite and
Greek ideas with the teachings of the Nahj al-balaghah !
The Nahj al-balaghah and the Notions of Kalam:
The Nahj al-balaghah, while it ascribes all the Attributes of perfection
to God, the Exalted, negates any separation of these Attributes from His
Essence and does not consider them as an appendage of Divine Essence. On
the other hand, the Ash'arites, as we know, consider the Divine
Attributes to be additional to Essence and the Mu'tazilites negate all
Attributes.
The Ash'arite believes in Separation [of the Attributes from the
Essence] The Mu'tazilite speaks of subservience [of the Attributes to
the Essence].
This has led some to imagine that the discourses found in the Nahj al-balaghah
on this topic are fabrications of a later period under the influence of
Mu'tazilite views; whereas, anyone with some insight can readily
perceive that the Attributes negated by the Nahj al-balaghah with
respect to Divine Essence are qualities of imperfection and limitation;
for the Divine Essence, being infinite and limitless, necessitates
identity of the Attributes with the Essence, not negation of the
Attributes as professed by the Mu'tazilites.
Had the Mu'tazilites reached such a notion they would never have negated
the Divine Attributes considering them subservient to the Essence. The
same is true of the views on the createdness or temporality (huduth) of
the Quran in the sermon 184. One may, possibly, imagine that these
passages of the Nahj al-balaghah relate to the latter heated
controversies among the Islamic theologians (mutakallimun) regarding the
eternity (qidam) or temporality (huduth) of the Holy Quran, and which
might have been added to the Nahj al-balaghah during the latter
centuries.
However, a little reflection will reveal that the discourses of the Nahj
al-balaghah related to this issue have nothing to do with the debate on
the Quran being either created or uncreated, which was a meaningless
controversy, but relates to the creative command (amr takwini), and Will
of the Almighty. 'Ali ('a) says that God's Will and His command
represent Divine Acts and, therefore, are hadith and posterior to the
Essence; for if the command and Will were co-eternal and identical with
His Essence, they will have, necessarily, to be considered His
associates and equals. 'Ali ('a) says: When He decrees the creation of a
thing, He says to it, "Be", and it assumes existence; but not through an
audible voice which strikes the ear or a cry that can be heard.
Indeed the speech of God, glory be to Him, is but His created Act, which
did not exist before [it came into existence]. Had it (Divine speech)
been itself eternal, it would be another god besides Him. (Sermon 186)
In addition, there are other musnad traditions on this subject related
from 'Ali ('a), only some of which have been collected in the Nahj al-balaghah,
and can be traced back to his time. On this basis, there is no room for
doubting their genuineness. If any superficial resemblance is observed
between the statements made by 'Ali ('a) and some views held by the
Mu'tazilah, the probability to be allowed in this connection is that
some of his ideas were adopted by the Mu'tazilah.
The controversies of the Muslim theologians (mutakallimun), both the
Shi'ah and the Sunni, the Asha'irah as well as the Mu'tazilah, generally
revolved around the doctrine of rational basis of ethical judgement
concerning good and evil (al-husn wa al-qubh al-'aqliyyan). This
doctrine which is not other than a practical principle operating in
human society, is considered by the mutakallimun to be also applicable
to the Divine sphere and govern the laws of creation; but we find no
trace of it in the Nahj al-balaghah, similarly there is no sign of it in
the Quran. Had the ideas and beliefs of the mutakallimun found their way
into the Nahj al-balaghah, first of all the traces of this doctrine
should have been found in that book.
The Nahj al-balaghah and Philosophical Concepts:
Some others, on coming across certain words such as 'existence' (wujud),
'non-existence' ('adam), 'temporality' (huduth) and 'pre-eternity' (qidam),
and so on in the Nahj al-balaghah, have been led to assume that these
terms entered the Muslim intellectual world under the influence of Greek
philosophy and were inserted, unintentionally or intentionally, into the
discourses of 'Ali ('a). If those who advocate this view had gone deeper
into the meanings of these words, they would not have paid heed to such
a hypothesis. The method and approach adopted in the arguments of the
Nahj al-balaghah is completely different from that of the philosophers
who lived before al-Sayyid al- Radi or during his time, or even those
born many centuries after the compilation of the Nahj al-balalghah .
Presently, we shall not discuss the metaphysics of Greek or Alexandrian
(Neo-Platonic) philosophy, but shall confine ourselves to the
metaphysical views propounded by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Khwajah Nasir
al-Din al-Tusi. Undoubtedly Muslim philosophers brought new problems
into philosophy under the influence of Islamic teachings which did not
exist before, and in addition to them, introduced radically original
ways of demonstration and inference to explain and argue their point
with regard to some other problems.
Nevertheless, what we learn from the Nahj al-balaghah is obviously
different from this approach. My teacher, 'Allamah Tabataba'i, in the
preface to his discourse on the traditions of Islamic scholarship,
writes: These statements help in resolving a number of problems in the
theological philosophy. Apart from the fact that Muslims were not
acquainted with these notions and they were incomprehensible to the
Arabs, basically there is no trace of them in the writings and
statements of pre-Islamic philosophers whose books were translated into
Arabic, and, similarly, they do not appear in the works of Muslim
philosophers, Arab or Persian.
These problems remained obscure and unintelligible, and every
commentator discussed them according to his own conjecture, until the
eleventh century of the Hijrah (17th century A.D.). Only then they were
properly understood for the first time- namely, the problem of the True
Unity (al-wahdat al-haqqah) of the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud) (a
non-numerical unity); the problem that the proof of the existence of the
Necessary Being is identical with the proof of His Unity (since the
Necessary Being is Absolute Existence, Him Being implies His Unity); the
problem that the Necessary Existent is the known-in-His-Essence (ma'lum
bil dhat); that the Necessary Being is known directly without the need
of an intermediary, and that the reality of every thing else is known
through the Necessary Being, not vice versa ... [7]
The arguments of the early Muslim philosophers like al-Farabi, Ibn Sina
and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, such as the discussions on the Divine
Essence and Attributes, such as Unity, Simplicity (basatah),
Self-Sufficiency, Knowledge, Power, Will, Providence, and so on, revolve
around the conception of the necessity of existence (wujub al-wujud),
from which all of them are derived, and the necessity of existence
itself is deduced indirectly. In this fashion it is demonstrated that
the existence of all possible existents (mumkinat) cannot be explained
without assuming the existence of the Necessary Being.
Although the argument used for proving the truth of this cannot be
called demonstration per impossible (burhan khulf) in view of its
indirect mode of inference, it resembles burhan khulf and hence it fails
to provide completely satisfactory demonstration, for it does not
explain the necessity of existence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sina in
his al-'Isharat claims that he has succeeded in discovering "the Why?"
(lima) of it and hence chooses to call his argument "burhan al-siddiqin"
(burhan limmi, i.e. causal proof). However, the latter philosophers
considered his exposition of "the Why?" (lima) as insufficient. In the
Nahj al-balaghah, necessity of existence is never used to explain the
existence of the possible beings (mumkinat).
That on which this book relies for this purpose is the real criterion of
the necessity of existence, that is, the absolute reality and pure being
of the Divine Essence. 'Allamah Tabataba'i, in the above-mentioned work,
while explaining a hadith of 'Ali ('a) found in al-Tawhid of al-Shaykh
al-Saduq, says: The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle
that Divine Being is a reality that does not accept any limits or
restrictions whatsoever. Because, God, the Most Exalted, is Absolute
Reality from Whom is derived the existence of all other beings within
the ontological limits and characteristics peculiar to themselves, and
their existence depends on that of the Absolute Being. [8]
In the Nahj al-balaghah the very basis of all discussions on Divine
Essence rests on the position that God is Absolute and Infinite Being,
which transcends all limits and finitude. No point of space or time, nor
any thing is devoid of Him. He is with everything, yet no thing is with
Him. Since He is the Absolute, and the Infinite, He transcends all time,
number, limit and proximity (all kinds of quiddities). That is, time and
space, number and limit are applicable to a lower stage i.e. stage of
Divine Acts and creation. Everything is from Him and returns unto Him.
He is the First of the first and the Last of the last. He precedes
everything and succeeds everything. This is the idea that forms the axis
of all discourses of the Nahj al-balaghah, and of which there is no
trace in the works of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali, and
Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. As pointed out by 'Allamah Tabataba'i,
these profound discussions of theology proper (ilahiyyat bil-ma'na al-'akhass)
are based on a series of inter-related problems which have been posited
in metaphysics (al-'umur al-'ammah). [9]
An elaborate discussion of those theological problems and their relevant
issues mentioned above is outside the scope of our present discussion.
There are two reasons for rejecting the claims that the theological
discussions of the Nahj al-balaghah were inventions of later writers
familiar with philosophical notions. Firstly, the kind of problems
discussed in the Nahj al-balaghah were not at all raised by any
philosopher till the time of al-Sayyid al-Radi, the compiler of the Nahj
al-balaghah. That the Unity of the Necessary Being is not of the
numerical kind and that Divine Essence precedes number; that the
existence of the Necessary Being implies Its Unity; the simple reality
of the Necessary Being; His immanence and other such notions were not
known to philosophy during or before al-Sayyid al-Radi's times.
Secondly, the axes of arguments presented in this book are altogether
different from the axes of philosophical discussions which have been
prevalent throughout history until the present day.
The Nahj al-balaghah and Western Philosophic Thought:
The Nahj al-balaghah has played a great role in the history of Eastern
Philosophy. Mulla Sadra, who brought a revolution in theological thought
(al-hikmat al-'ilahiyyah), was under profound influence of 'Ali's
discourses.
His method of argument with regard to the problems of tawhid is the
method of inferring the Essence from the Essence, and also deducing the
Attributes and Acts from the Essence, and all these arguments are based
on the belief that there exists the Necessary Being only. These
arguments are based on radically different general principles, which are
elaborated in his system of metaphysics.
Eastern theological thought (al-hikmat al-'ilahiyyah) attained fruition
and strength from the sources of Islamic teachings and was firmly
established on unviolable foundations. However, theological philosophy
in the West remained deprived of such source of inspiration. The
widespread philosophical malaise of inclination towards materialism in
the West has many causes whose discussion is outside the scope of our
discourse. But we believe that the major cause of this phenomenon is the
weakness and insufficiency of theological conceptions of Western
religious thought. [10]
Anyone interested in making a comparative study of the approaches
pointed out in these chapters, should first study the arguments advanced
by Western philosophers such as Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz,
Kant and others for proving the existence of God and their discussions
about acceptance or rejection of various arguments, then he should
compare them with the burhan al-siddiqin argument advanced by Mulla
Sadra under the inspiration of 'Ali's words. He would see for himself
the wide chasm that separates the one from the other.
Notes:
[1] The term ta'wil has been defined variously, but generally when used
in the opposition to tafsir (which is applied to the explanation of the
literal and explicit meanings of the Quranic texts) it is applied to
interpretation of the Quranic verses which goes beyond their literal
meaning. According to Imamiyyah Shi'ah, no one except the Prophet (S)
and the twelve Imams (A) is entitled to draw tawil of the Quranic
verses. To illustrate what is meant by ta'wil consider these examples:
(1) According to Shi'ah hadith, the verse 2:158, Where ever you maybe,
God will bring you all together', pertains to the 313 companions of al
Imam al Mahdi (A) whom God will gather in a certain place from various
parts of the earth in a single night. (2) According to another hadith
the verse 67:30, 'Say: What think you? If your water (in wells) should
have vanished into the earth, then who would bring you running water?'
pertains to the ghaybah (occultation) of al Imam al Mahdi (A). Such
interpretations, which obviously go beyond the apparent meaning of the
Quranic verses, are called ta'wil.
[2] Allamah S.M.H Tabatabai, Usul e falsafah wa rawish e riyalism (The
Principles and Method of Philosophy of Realism), Introduction to vol. I
[3] Muhammad Sulayman Nadawi, Madha khasara al alam bi inhitat al
Muslimin, vol. IV, p. 97
[4] Ibid., p. 135
[5] Allamah Tabatabai, op. Cit
[6] Ibid, vol. V
[7] Maktab e tashayyu, No. 2 p. 120
[8] Ibid, p. 126
[9] Ibid, p. 157
[10] See Murtada Mutahhari, Ilal e garayesh beh maddigari (The causes of
inclination towards Materialism), under the chapter: Naresa iha ye
mafahi me falsafiI (The inadequacies of [Western] Philosophical Ideas) |