Eternity of Moral
Values
By Ayatullah
Murtadha Mutahhari
Before entering the discussion
concerning the eternity of moral values it should be noted that
according to the philosophies of `being' reality and knowledge as well
as moral values are considered to be permanent. Though here I will not
be concerned with the permanence of reality, but it is necessary to deal
with the question as to why reality and ethics are dealt with
separately.
What is the difference between moral
principles and other principles which we refer to as `reality'? After
all moral values also constitute certain principles and that which is
said concerning scientific principles, that they are eternally true,
should also apply to moral values.
However, I also think that the right thing is to keep these two issues
separate. But first of all I must refer to a minor issue to establish
that the issue of eternity of moral values is very important for us and
that it is closely related to the eternity of Islam.
Ethics comprises certain teachings, and
if we believe the moral, humane, and social teachings of Islam to be
transitory then the conclusion will be that the teachings of Islam
dealing with morality and education are also subject to change. That is,
it would imply that such principles had a validity in their own their
time, and with changes in conditions these moral principles should also
change and so should the basic teachings of Islam. As a result the major
part of Islam would be obsolete and should be abolished. Of course, the
issue of evolution of reality is related to this matter, but the issue
of relativity of moral values has a greater bearing on the eternity of
Islam. Let us now proceed to clarify the point as to why the issue of
ethics is separated from the issue of reality.
Speculative Wisdom and Practical
Wisdom
Reality relates to theoretical
principles and ethics deals with practical principles. In other words,
ethics is subsumed under practical wisdom (hikmat-e `amali) and reality
is subsumed under theoretical wisdom (hikmat-e nazari); therefore, we
cannot apply the principles of practical wisdom to reality, for
theoretical wisdom deals with facts as they are or were; whereas
practical wisdom is confined to man and deals with things as they ought
to be-that is, as to how man is to conduct himself-and hence is
prescriptive (insha). But the nature of theoretical wisdom is
descriptive (ikhbar), that is, it deals with the question as to whether
a certain proposition corresponds to facts or not, and if it is does,
whether it is eternally true. But such questions do not arise in ethics.
In our philosophical literature,
theoretical reason and practical reason are regarded as two different
types of human faculties. But Muslim philosophers did not discuss their
features and differences in sufficient detail. However, they have left
useful hints concerning the issue. They suggest that the former faculty
is inherent in the soul by means of which it tries to discover the
external world; whereas the latter consists of a series of perceptions
of the soul, which administers the body, for the body's management.
Practical reason is considered to be a
natural arm of the soul and theoretical reason as a metaphysical arm.
Thus the soul possesses two perfections: theoretical perfection and
practical perfection (the philosophers hold that the essence and nature
of human being is knowledge and its perfection lies in knowledge,
whereas the mystics do not consider knowledge as the ultimate perfection
of man and are of the view that a perfect man is one who attains to
reality not one who discovers it).
Regarding the faculty of practical
reason, they hold that the soul as the administrator of the body is
subject to certain principles for better governing the body as a prelude
to its attaining perfection.
Early Muslim philosophers defined justice in terms of freedom (justice
in body). The soul stands in need of-the body and it cannot attain
theoretical perfections without it, but in order that the soul should be
able to make the best use of the body, it must establish a kind of
balance between its faculties.
The faculty which establishes such a
balance between. soul and body is an active faculty. In case this
balance is established, the soul is not dominated by the body, rather it
is the body which is subordinated to the soul. They considered justice
to be a kind of subordination of the body to the soul in which the body
is controlled by the soul. This is all that our early philosopher have
said on this issue. It seems that, relatively speaking, Ibn Sina
(980-1030) has treated the issue of theoretical and practical wisdom
more thoroughly than any other Muslim philosopher. In the section on
theology of his al-Shifa', Ibn Sinaa classifies wisdom into practical
and theoretical. In the section on logic of the Shifa'; he treats it in
more detail and probably in his Mubahathat he discusses it in greater
detail than in any other place. On the whole these old discussions
provide a good ground for study, but they have not treated the -subject
sufficiently and there even exists some ambiguity about practical
reason. That which can be inferred from the statements of some of them
is that practical reason is a kind of cognitive faculty of the soul.
That is, they maintain that our
intellect possess two kinds of cognitive faculties, one is the faculty
of cognition used in theoretical sciences and the other is the faculty
used in practical sciences. But others like Mulla Hadi Sabzawari
(1833-1910) hold that the term `intellect' (`aql) is used equivocally
for theoretical and practical reason and that practical reason is not a
cognitive faculty, that it is a faculty of action and not one of
cognition.
Hence their statements do not make clear whether or not practical and
theoretical reason are two cognitive faculties (regardless of whether
they are two distinct faculties or two aspects of one faculty), or if
one of these is a cognitive and the other a practical faculty. In the
later case, using the term `reason' for practical reason is equivocal,
that is, practical reason is not reason in the sense of a cognitive
faculty.
Subjectivity of Normative Judgments
It should be noted that Allamah
Tatatabais discussion of i 'tibariyat (subjective or normative ideas) in
the sixth chapter of his book Usul-e falsafeh wa ravish-e realism (`The
Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism') is undoubtedly an
invaluable and original idea (unfortunately I was not able to write
complete footnotes on it). Its only demerit is that he has himself
conceived this idea and then followed it up without relating it to the
statements of his predecessors which could help us in tracing the roots
of these issues in the words of thinkers like Ibn Sina and others on
practical reason and theoretical reason.
It would have been better if he had
started from their statements. The reason for such a gap is that his
point of departure was jurisprudence ('ilm al-usul) not philosophy. He
was inspired by the ideas of the late Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Isfahani
regarding itibariyat. Therefore, he did not relate it to the views of
the philosophers. Allamah Tabatabai maintains and this is of course my
interpretation-that whatever we ascribe to practical wisdom relates to
the world of i'tibari (subjective) notions. Thus, theoretical wisdom or
objective truth consists of objective ideas which are the real face of
things. Practical ideas are normative notions. Normative ideas comprise
of commands and prohibitions and all those notions which are dealt with
in 'ilm al-usul. The Allamah considers all itibariyat of the type where
an objective idea is extended and applied to something else; human
reason or the soul as a cognitive faculty cannot originate or create a
concept, as in its literal and metaphorical use of words. A metaphor
consists of the application of the literal and non-metaphorical meaning
in a metaphorical sense.
Whether we agree with Sakkaki's view
and hold that the word retains its original meaning and some other thing
is imagined as its instance, or disagree with him and believe that the
word is used in another meaning, one thing is clear: that the intellect
and the soul are unable to spontaneously create concepts like ownership.
On the contrary it borrows a concept that already exists in its
objective form and applies it in its metaphorical sense.
He started from this point and followed it up opening up a very
extensive field. In this approach all moral concepts, including good and
evil and the like, are considered to be itibari concepts. He has
discussed in detail whether the notion of `good' is derived from `ought'
or `ought' from `good.' Earlier in Najaf he had written an article in
Arabic on the normative sciences ('ulum-e itibari) and the article in
Persian (i.e. the sixth chapter of his above-mentioned book) is based on
its contents.
Regarding the concept of `ought,' he
arrived at the conclusion that all 'oughts' stem from the fact that
nature in itself has some ends towards which it moves. In all activities
in the domains of inanimate objects, plants, animals, and man, so far as
they fall within the domain of instinct and are not voluntary, it is
nature that moves towards its goal. At the human level there are certain
acts which takes place by the means of volition and thought. In such
acts, too, man has certain objectives which have to be attained
voluntarily.
These ends are also the ends of nature,
but it cannot achieve them directly but only through the agency of man's
will and thought. It is here that a need for these normative notions
arises and they come into existence spontaneously. For example, man's
nature, like that of plants, needs food, but he should obtain it by
means of volition and thought, unlike plants, which obtain food from the
ground directly through their roots, and unlike animals, which are drawn
towards food by instinct (whose nature is also not well understood).
But man has to do this by conscious
volition and effort, without being aware that the system of nature uses
his apparatus of thought as its instrument in order to achieve its
goals. Man innately possesses two systems: the system of nature as well
as the system of thought and will. The latter is subordinate to the
former and it is directed to achieving nature's ends. The natural end is
reflected in the form of a need or desire in man's soul, for instance,
the inclination towards food.
Early Muslim philosophers defined the
process of voluntary action as follows: first there is conception of the
action, followed by judgment of its usefulness and inclination towards
it (there were different views of it), then the stage of resolution,
which is followed by emergence of will, after which the voluntary act
takes place.
Allamah Tabataba i s agrees with this
description, but he considers the role of judgment as fundamental.
However, here the judgment of the soul is not the kind of theoretical
(descriptive) judgment which earlier Muslim philosophers used to call
`assent of benefit,' but is a prescriptive judgment (You ought to do
this).
He stresses mainly on the point that
all voluntary acts contain a kind of command and a prescriptive and
normative judgment, for example, "This ought to be done," "This ought
not to be done." It is such oughts that cause man to be drawn towards
the natural end. The Allamah probably conceives all acts of volition as
terminating in knowledge.
These ideas came to the mind of Allamah
Tabatabai and he followed them up independently without studying others'
views in this regard. Once I even asked him whether what he says in this
regard is in agreement with the ideas of the early Muslim philosopher
regarding the difference between practical and theoretical wisdom and
their view about the normative character of the notions of good and
evil. In their debates with the theologians (mutakallimin) our early
philosophers mention certain basic criteria for logical argument and
they mention good and evil as criteria that pertain to rhetoric and
dialectics, and maintain that the notions of good and evil cannot be
employed in logical arguments. They are of tile view that good and evil
derive from custom and cite the example of Indians who consider killing
of animals as immoral.
If one were to scan philosophical works
one would not find a single instance, where the notions of good and evil
have been employed to decide a theoretical issue. On the contrary the
mutakallimin always base their arguments on the notions of moral and
immoral. For instance, they hold that the rule of Divine grace is good
and that such and such a thing is unseemly for God and that such and
such a thing is obligatory for Him, and the like.
The philosophers consider these as normative issues which cannot form
the basis of rational argument. Like Allamah Tabatabai, they also
consider good and evil as normative notions. Another point which gives
further importance to his statements is that others like Bertrand
Russell, who claim to have originated a new approach in contemporary
philosophy, also. have a similar viewpoint.
Undoubtedly Allamah Tabataba i was
unaware of their views, and I myself, while writing explanatory notes on
the Allamah's book Usul-e falsafeh wa rewish-a realism, did not notice
that his view of the practical sciences and ethics is something new and
identical with the latest views about ethics. Perhaps the development of
such an idea in the Allamah's mind (about forty years ago in Najaf) was
contemporaneous with the development of this view in European thought.
In any case the Allamah was definitely unaware of their views.
Among modern European philosophers, Bertrand Russell has elaborated this
issue seriously. In his book A History of Western Philosophy, Russell
states his viewpoint while discussing Plato's philosophy.
Plato has sublime ideas on the topic of
ethics. In his view theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are of the
same kind and he looks at them from the same point of view. Regarding
the concept of good in ethics he holds that morality means that man
should seek what is good, and the good is a cognizable reality
independent of the soul. That is, the object of human quest is the same
in ethics and objective sciences, as in mathematics or medicine, which
are concerned with external objects independent of the human mind.
According to Plato moral values are
realities independent of man, so man should try to know them as he tries
to know any other reality.
Here it becomes clear that early Muslim philosophers had selective
approach in relation to the views of the ancient philosophers. They
accepted some of their views and discarded their incorrect views without
indicating what they were accepting and what they were discarding. So
far as ethics is concerned, they accepted many of Plato's views but they
rejected this idea of Plato, and with justification.
While discussing Plato's views,
Bertrand Russell expresses his own viewpoint. He says that we have to
analyze the issue of ethics and see where it leads to. How did Plato
think when he said that the good exists independent of us. Then he
proceeds to analyze in a way very similar to the Allama's analysis.
Russell holds that good and evil are
relative terms whose meaning is determined by man's relation to objects.
When we wish to achieve a goal, we say of a means that helps us attain
that goal that `It is good.' Now, what is meant by saying of a certain
thing that `It is good'? It means that in order to achieve that goal we
ought to use this means. The very `ought to use is equal to saying `it
is good.'
Hence it is wrong to hold that the good is an objective quality inherent
in a thing. Plato thinks that goodness is inherent in things, like
whiteness or roundness etc., while it is not so. For example, when we
say `Honesty is good,' it is because of a goal which we have chosen. In
other words, it is good for us for achieving our goal and therefore we
ought to employ it. Yet, it does not mean that it is good for everyone.
It is good only for those who have such a goal. Otherwise if one had an
opposite goal it would not be good for him.
Bertrand Russell and other philosophers
applied their logical analysis to ethics. They come to the conclusion
that `good' or `evil' are normative in nature. The mistake of the
philosophers down to the present day is that they have thought ethical
issues to be like those of mathematics or science. Their approaches to
ethics has been similar to their approach to mathematics and physics.
For example, as in physics one studies the nature of the magnet to
discover its properties, in ethics as well they thought that good and
evil are discoverable properties of things.
Q: Ethical issues are like scientific
issues with the difference that they belong to different realms;
otherwise the criterion is the same in both the cases.
A: There is no difference between this domain or that. For example, when
man speaks, his speaking is a concrete fact no matter whether what he
says is true or false. Does this speech have an external and objective
property called `good' or `evil'? No. Truth or falsehood do not have any
objective quality called good or evil. Basically, the meaning of good
and evil are determined in term of goals. Truth helps one to achieve
one's goal, therefore, one must be truthful. Here the property of
goodness is attributed to truthfulness. Lying, owing to its effects,
prevent individuals and society from achieving their goal. Therefore,
one must not lie and lying is bad. Here one does not have anything
except "one ought to say" and "one ought not to say" Good and evil are
abstracted from `ought' and `ought not.' Of course, it does not mean
that ethics is devoid of reality. Later on we will explain it.
The Europeans thought that they had
discovered a very new idea and even today it is a live issue in European
philosophy and enjoys wide acceptance. In their view, the ethical
theories of Plato, Aristotle, Kant and the like are outdated. They have
finally reached this viewpoint. As I said, the early Muslim philosophers
also have dealt with this issue and a shortcoming of Allamah Tabataba i
s work is that he does not relate it to their ideas.
According to Mr. Ha'iri, one of the
questions he was asked to answer in a test (in the West) was concerning
the relation between theoretical and practical sciences. As the
theoretical sciences are related to the practical sciences, they are not
isolated from one another. In modern terms, theoretical science
constitutes world view whereas practical science constitutes ideology,
as in the case of dialectical logic and materialist philosophy which
constitute the Marxist world view and their ideology is also based on
their world view.
Now the question is how can we derive a
prescriptive and normative judgment from factual premises? If the
premises are descriptive, no problems arises if the conclusion is also a
descriptive statement. For example, we may say A is equal to B, and B is
equal to C; therefore, A is equal to C. However, in the other case the
reasoning will have this form: A is equal to B, and B is equal to C;
therefore, it ought to be that . . . . How can we drive a normative
judgment from a descriptive proposition? Is there any syllogism whose
premises are factual and its conclusion is normative and prescriptive? I
am not saying that there isn't. But if it exists, how should it be
analyzed? The point is that this topic is a live issue in the West.
Russell and his like-minded philosophers are of the view that eternity
of moral values is meaningless.
Until this point my purpose was to
clarify this point that good and evil are not objective and concrete
properties of things that can be discovered, as is the case in
theoretical sciences. That is, it will be wrong to investigate ethical
principles by such a method, for it confuses between normative and
factual propositions. However, it may be asked whether there are two
types of norms, one mutable and the other immutable. This is another
point of contention which we have with them (European thinkers).
Incidentally Allamah Tabatabai is also of the view that norms are of two
types, immutable and mutable. He has not discussed immutable norms-and
the entire issue in general-in any great detail, but he bases his theory
on two types of norms. For immutable norms he has given the examples of
justice and injustice, stating that the goodness of justice and the evil
of injustice are immutable, and there are many mutable norms as well.
Permanence of Ethical Norms
From this point onwards we shall take
up the discussion about the issue of `ought.' No doubt some 'oughts' are
particular and related to individuals. For instance, one person may need
a certain kind of training, and he might say, "I should take this
subject," while another who does not need it would say, "I should not
take that subject." Basically, when two persons fight each other, each
of them fights for the sake of a certain ought.
There is no doubt that individual and particular 'oughts' are relative.
For example, when I say that this food is good for me, this statement
has a theoretical and a practical aspect. My conclusion concerning the
benefit of the food constitutes its theoretical aspect and `I .ought to
eat that food' constitutes the practical aspect. In short, these kinds
of oughts are particular and changeable.
An important question in ethics is, Are there any universal and absolute
'oughts' shared by all human beings? In case there are such oughts, how
can such universal oughts be explained on the basis that every `ought'
is directed towards some goal? Incidentally, we reach some fine
conclusions at this point.
Concerning the difference between
theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom it is not sufficient to say that
the formers deals with `is' and the latter with `ought.' This is not a
sufficient explanation for practical wisdom. After all practical wisdom
is wisdom and wisdom deals with universal issues. Hence practical wisdom
should be defined as dealing with universal 'oughts,' otherwise there
are also certain 'oughts' in geometry, industry etc., but they have
nothing to do with practical wisdom. What is to be noted here is that
there are universal 'oughts' which are familiar to every mind.
Therefore, such 'oughts' must be directed towards goals which are not
particular and individual. If we could prove such 'oughts,' we will have
to accept that they are rooted in the soul and that man is not confined
to physical nature only. This will be one of the proofs of the
immaterial nature of soul.
Kant also reached the immortality of
the soul through moral issues: Man's physical nature has some needs
which are limited and relative. The needs of one person differ from
those of another person. The 'oughts' for meeting such needs are also
different and often contradict one another. There are many 'oughts'
which are opposed to other `ougths' and so such 'oughts' are not of an
ethical nature. But man, by virtue of his soul, enjoys a station
which-like man's physical nature, to which his outward will and thought
are subject-draws him towards its own goals. Man's physical nature draws
him towards its goals in order to attain its own perfection.
It needs food, and we say we ought-to
eat food. According to Schopenhauer, we are made to feel pleasure and to
be on look out for pleasure in the world of ideas, while we are unaware
of the fact that within our inner being it is nature which seeks to
achieve its ends. It is nature that moves towards its end, but it
provides pleasure for us in order to make us serve its own purposes.
While in the world of ideas we are drawn towards pleasure, in reality we
move to fulfill the goals of nature. For example, when the baby cries,
it is nature which seeks to bring him up. When the baby cries due to the
feeling of pain, it is nature which declares its need, having subjected
the baby's feeling and mind.
Man enjoys a certain spiritual perfection and sublimity which is rooted
in his God-given nobility and dignity (some 'oughts' are meant to
achieve that spiritual perfection). When someone says, `I ought to do
such and such a thing,' it means `I must attain to that excellence,'
although such a goal may not be reflected in his outer consciousness.
Those excellences are common to all men, and, therefore, in this respect
all men feel the same kind of imperative. The second justification for
universal imperatives is the issue of social spirit. It is said that man
is a social creature and he has certain oughts, to meet not his
individual but his social needs.
The same key that man is impelled to
seek the satisfaction of his individual needs he is impelled to seek the
satisfaction of his social needs. Had there been no relations between
man and his fellow men, such oughts would not have arisen. For instance,
if I had no relations with anyone I would not make any efforts to feed
other people. Such imperatives are related to a higher self, be it an
individual higher self or a higher social self. That higher self seeks
to achieve its goals. That self causes man to perform moral acts. Those
acts which are performed for the sake of the higher individual self or
the social self have permanent principles, which are, firstly, universal
and same for all individuals and, secondly, are permanent and not
temporary.
The other point which has been raised concerns the philosophy of being
and the philosophy of becoming. According to the philosophy of being
moral values are permanent and therefore ethical principles are
eternally true. However, according to the philosophy of becoming moral
values are relative and transitory; that is, they are valid during a
certain time and invalid in other times.
This is a very important issue, for
apart from ethics it touches other judgments as well. According to the
philosophy of becoming no truth is permanent. Reality is transient and
therefore prescriptions are also transitory, for the difference between
truth and morality is that the former is descriptive and the latter is
prescriptive, one is theoretical and the other is practical. Inevitably
this question also arises in the case of all religious precepts and is
not confined to what we mean by the term `ethics' (akhlaq). What they
(i.e. Westerners) imply by `ethics' is a more general sense which
includes all prescriptions and the notions of good and evil.
At the outset an objection may be
raised here, that the philosophy of becoming does not necessarily imply
that truth is changeable. For as we have said the philosophy of becoming
relates to external reality, and even if one were to admit that there is
nothing except becoming, it does not imply that truth (which is related
to the mind) is subject to change. Of course, we accept the implication
that should facts, which include human thought, be subject to change,
consequently truth as human thought will also be subject to change. But
they do not make such an assertion. We believe that truth, which is the
content of thought, is inseparable from external and mental existence
except in conception.
For example, the statement "Zayd was
standing on Friday" is always true This statement itself, apart from
external or mental existence, is not something that may be said to be
neither in the mind nor in external reality, a proposition that is
eternally true. This proposition has either external existence or mental
existence.' But when man thinks about it, he first abstracts it from
mental existence, and after abstracting its meaning declares it to be
eternally true. We believe that if thought itself were changeable, its
content will also be changeable, and the statement "Zayd was standing on
Friday" will not be conceived today in the mind as it was conceived
yesterday. It will change into something else.
This was in relation to the permanence
of truth. The same objection can be raised in relation to morals values.
Suppose we believe in a philosophy of becoming, and it implies that
truth is changeable. But morals and precepts are a set of prescriptions
and these are normative in nature. The changeability of truth does not
necessitate the changeability of norms.
In an article, "Khatm-e Nubuwwat,"
("The Ultimacy of the Prophethood"), I have pointed out that if anybody
claims that all things are subject to change, then the ultimate prophecy
and everlasting laws become meaningless. Our position is that if truth
be mutable it does not imply that prescriptions should also be mutable.
For prescriptions derive from convention and the law of change of facts
does not apply to prescriptions.
Thus, it is wrong to assert that a philosophy of becoming will imply
mutability of moral values. However, there is another argument that may
be offered to support this view.
This other argument is that every
prescription, ethical or non-ethical, is based on certain expediencies.
This view coincides with the view of the theologians, and jurisprudents
following them, who maintain that "religious obligations are subtle
instances of rational obligations," or, in the words of Nary, certain
benefits and harms underlie the causes of religious precepts, which are
meant to achieve those benefits and are therefore subordinate to
objective benefits and harms, like an effect subordinate to its cause.
The benefits are facts and commands and prohibitions are based on
conventions and norms. But the benefits and harms from which the
commands and prohibitions stem are not permanent, for they are facts.
Thus when the former are not permanent the latter also will not be
permanent. The objection to the eternity of moral values takes another
form in accordance with this argument.
Now we wish to make a fundamental
examination of ethical criteria and confine our discussion to ethics in
our own special sense. The question of religious precepts requires a
wide-ranging study and has many ramifications pertaining to worship,
social and financial issues and other matters.
In the sphere of ethics, one may maintain that moral values are
permanent on the basis that moral values are identical with reality, in
the sense that a moral act is good because it is essentially attributed
with the quality of goodness. The immoral act is bad because it is
attributed with the quality of badness. Hence every act is either
essentially moral or essentially immoral, although it may be said that
there are some acts which are neither essentially moral nor immoral.
It means that moral goodness and evil
are objective qualities of things inherent in their essences, and that
which is essential is not mutable. That which is morally good is good
forever and that which is immoral will always remain immoral. We should
do that which is morally good and refrain from that which is immoral,
and this is a self-evident and indisputable judgment of reason. This is
one of the arguments that may offered in favor of the permanence-of
ethical values. Such an argument is based on the essential character of
good and evil which are considered as objective attributes.
Muslim philosophers have not discussed this issue but they do not
believe in good and evil as being inherent in things. In logic, they
consider any reference to morality or immorality as reference to popular
convention which finds use only in dialectics and rhetoric. They even
point out that morals vary with nations and they cite the example of
Indians .who consider slaughter of animals as immoral.
However they do not elaborate and do not explain why the notions of
moral goodness and evil cannot be employed in rational arguments. They
do not explain why they are different from mathematical propositions and
what criterion underlies this distinction. They only say that morality
or immorality pertain to the rules of practical reason. However it is
dear that practical reason develops such notions in order to achieve
certain goals. In any case they have not elaborated upon this matter.
The Origins of Normative Notions
Among philosophers Allamah Tabatabai
has treated this issue more thoroughly than anyone else. In the sixth
chapter of his book Usul-e falsafeh wa ravishe realism, he has discussed
profoundly this issue, which is related partly to philosophy in that it
explains the process of development of ideas by the mind. However, the
greater part of this discussion relates to jurisprudence (`ilm al-usul).
There he has discussed the origin and character of the development of
normative ideas, and this topic deserves to studied in greater depth and
thoroughness. However, here I will give a brief summary of his ideas
relating to this discussion.
He begins by asserting that one of the
functions of the mind is that it abstracts certain ideas from external
objects (an operation that does not involve any innovation) then applies
them to another reality, that is, it applies the definition of one thing
to another thing. In technical and literary terms, it invents metaphors.
A metaphor, especially in accordance with Sakkald's view, is not simply
the use of a word in some other meaning It does not simply involve
applying, for instance. the word `lion,' after divesting of its meaning,
to a person with a similar quality. No. A metaphor involves a change in
meaning not a change in word. Actually what we do is that we see, for
instance, Zayd as an instance of the meaning of `lion,' then we apply
the word `lion' to him. This is a kind of innovation of the mind. The
late Ayatullah Burujerdi would make an interesting remark in this
relation. He would say that when we say, "I saw a lion shooting', this
statement is actually composed of the two following statements: "I saw
Zayd shooting," and "Zayd is like a lion." lie agreed with Sakkaki's
conception of the metaphor.
Such is Allamah Tabataba i s notion of
the mind's capacity to formulate and invent concepts by supposing-not
arbitrarily but in accordance with a certain basis-one thing as an
instance of another thing. Another observation that he makes (though I
do not agree with its generalization) is that the difference between
animals on the one hand and plants and inanimate things on the other is
that the latter move towards their end in one predetermined direction
alone. Nature, in the course of its normal movement, is equipped with
means through which it moves inexorably towards its goal. Animals also,
in respect of their physical and natural being (not as beings possessing
cognition and mind), like plants move directly towards their end in the
natural world.
But in their case, in most of their
activities, the means of nature do not suffice to direct animals towards
their goals. That is why they employ their mental and cognitive
faculties to achieve their ends and in fact there emerges a kind of
harmony between physical nature (which is unconscious) and the mind
which functions in a manner enabling nature to achieve its ends. The
mind is however directed to achieving a series of ends which are
supposed to be different from the ends of nature and one imagines that
the harmony between the two is accidental.
The cognitive nature of man and animal is such that when they perceive
and conceive an object there arises a desire and appetite for it as [an
expectation of] pleasure in attaining it and of pain in the failure to
attain it. This is followed by the motive to obtain the pleasure or to
avoid the pain. For instance, man feels hunger and with his past
experience' of the pleasure in eating food he seeks food in order to
obtain that pleasure. But at the same time in the process of this act
nature too attains its end, for the body needs food in order to replace
the materials it has consumed.
Eating serves both the ends, the conscious purpose of pleasure is
attained and at the same time nature also satisfies its need. Hence, the
question arises: Are these two acts unconnected with each other and is
their coincidence something accidental? Is it possible for the case to
be otherwise, that is, a person might feel pleasure in eating stones
while his stomach requires some other food? Is it an accident that
delicious foods which bring pleasure to one who eats also helps satisfy
the nature's needs?
Or is it the case that there is no
accident involved here and there exists a kind of harmony between the
two, where one is primary and the other is secondary? In case there is
no accident involved here, is the conscious desire to obtain pleasure
and to avoid pain the primary principle which requires an apparatus that
may cooperate with it for the end of pleasure by digesting food and
absorbing nourishing substances? Or is the case quite the inverse and it
is nature which constitutes the primary principle, having subjugated the
conscious mind to its service. Undoubtedly, there is some kind of
harmony between the natural and conscious ends. Hence every animal takes
pleasure in what nature needs and nature also needs that which brings
pleasure. For instance, a woman is equipped with organs and glands
required for child bearing and nursing and she finds pleasure in these
acts. The animal that lays eggs takes pleasure in that act, and an
animal that gives birth to a child takes pleasure in child bearing.
There exists a strong harmony between them.
It is wrong to think that purposive
movement is confined to conscious beings only When it is said that
nature has certain ends, some people may raise doubts as to whether
unconscious nature may have ends. In fact ends are related to that very
unconscious nature and the conscious mind has ends which are incidental
to the ends of nature. The end of nature is to move. towards its
perfection. As remarked by Ibn Sinn, the possession of consciousness
does not make puposive a being that lacks purpose. Purposiveness is
related to the essence of a thing. Sometimes a thing is aware of its end
and sometimes it is not.
Q: There is not always a harmony
between pleasure and natural need. Many pleasures are harmful for nature
and injurious to its perfection.
A: Deviant cases are not to be taken into consideration, particularly in
die case of human being who act according to reason. What I mean is that
there is a general harmony that exists to such an extent that it cannot
be accidental. Exceptional cases, like that of the sick person who needs
medicine without feeling any pleasure in taking it, arise out of a kind
of difference between two exigencies, a topic which has its own details.
An animal takes pleasure in eating its medicine because it acts
according to instinct, while the human being, who acts according to his
reason, does not take pleasure in it.
Allamah Tabataba i says that the world
of normative concepts begins here. The way he explains the issue it
appears as if all animate beings including man and animals possess such
ideas. But I do not agree with this generalization. According to him
there is a necessary relation between nature and ends, like the
concrete, objective and philosophical relation between cause and effect.
Now in the world of conception man takes the objective relation of
necessity-as opposed to the relation of contingency-between two things
in nature and applies that relation to two things between which there is
no such real relation.
For example, he applies the term `lion'
to a brave man. Here, too, man applies the term `necessity' as found in
external nature to the relation between himself and his goal. Such
necessities and oughts created by the mind, arise out of such
conceptions. The Allamah is of the view that such oughts exist in every
voluntary act and in every conscious animal. The earlier Muslim
philosophers did not believe in such an ought or imperative. They only
held that man first conceives the benefit in something, then there
arises a desire for it, followed by a resolution. They described its
various stages stating that first there is conception followed by a
judgment of the benefit. This judgment in their view posits something
objective, that is, a certain object has a certain benefit. The final
stage is the stage of volition. However, they did not believe that a
normative judgment was involved here. But Allamah Tabataba i holds that
such a conception and imperative is involved here and the statement that
something is good has no other meaning. When we say that it is good to
do something, its `goodness' arises from here. There is another issue
involved here as to whether `good" arises out of `ought' or the case is
the reverse. As the Allamah holds that `ought' is the first formulation
(itibar), he holds that `good' arises from it. "It is good to do so"
signifies a kind of inclination towards something and it is as if one
were attributing objective and concrete qualities to human actions.
The Theory of Employment
Then he has some other views to which
he repeatedly refers in his exegesis of the Holy Qur'an, al-Mizan, and
in other places. He holds that one of the normative formulations is that
of `employment' (istikhdam). To explain, man has a certain relation to
his limbs and faculties and this relation is objective, real and
concrete. My hands are at my service. All bodily organs of man are owned
by man and form an integral part of his being and are really at the
service of man. He says that every external object may-take the form of
a tool in the service of man, and in the same way that his hands belong
to him he considers other objects as his own. This kind of extension is
what typical of subjective formulations. (itibar).
Man extends the boundaries of that which is limited to his existence to
other beings. He considers such a human tendency to extend concepts as
something instinctive Then he adds that this kind of conceptual attitude
is not limited to inanimate objects, plants, etc.; rather man views even
other human beings from the viewpoint of `employment.' Man is created an
exploiter and this is a natural tendency in him. He accepts social and
moral issues as secondary principles. However, in this chapter he does
not discuss this issue in detail but he does so in his exegesis,
al-Mizan, under verse 2:213, "Mankind were a single nation". Perhaps
there is apparently a contradiction in his statements in different
places.
At one place he says that `employment'
is a natural principle and that social justice is at the same time
natural to man but is modified by the other natural principle. Sometimes
in his exegesis he is explicit that man is not social by nature but
social by adaptation. In the sixth chapter of his Usul-e falsafeh wa
ravish-e realism, he states that man is social by nature, but what he
means is by adaptation, as mentioned by him elsewhere. So he does not
hold that man is social by nature. His socialization is outcome of the
result of equilibrium between two opposite instincts. His statements
appear in this regard to be similar to the views of contemporary
evolutionists and Darwinians who believe the struggle for survival to be
fundamental in man.
The principle of employment is a respectable form of the Darwinian idea,
for according to it struggle for survival constitutes the basis of the
human being and cooperation arises out of struggle. Man struggles for
survival, but the enemy is not always of one kind; when several men face
a common enemy and feel that they cannot defeat him individually,
cooperation is the only way to survival.
Here cooperation is like political
treaties between states, meant only to deter the common enemy In fact
such cooperation arises out of struggle. Hence when there is no more a
common enemy, conflict begins among apparent friends. Again after some
dine differences arise within the dominating group and grow into a war
among them. If finally there remain only two individuals they fight
against each other until the fittest survives.
If we trace the roots of moral rules on cooperation, friendship, and
unity, they will be seen to stem from conflict. The implication is that
if you want to survive in your confrontation with the enemy (whether it
is nature or something else) you should be honest, truthful and so on.
This is the viewpoint of the evolutionists, and the Allamah's ideas lead
to such a conclusion, though he does not say so explicitly.
Q: Does man have a natural inclination
towards evil?
A: That is what it means. However, evil is relative, and from the
viewpoint of the individual it is good. Every individual has a natural
tendency to seek his own good, which makes him treat others as tools
(such is the Allamah's view). Man cannot refrain from treating others as
tools.
Q: Struggle for survival is not the same as `employment.' Sometime they
may coincide and sometimes not.
A: I did not say that the two concepts are identical. What I means is
that both of them lead to the same conclusion. When we say that every
individual tries to treat others as his tools and to use them, when such
a tendency is universal it will automatically lead to conflict.
The Allamah continues his discussion on normative formulations and most
of it has greater relevance to jurisprudence than to ethical philosophy
and its relevant part was that which we have described.
He further holds that man formulates the oughts and ought nots to attain
certain ends. Since these ends are transient, precepts and laws will
also be subject to change and as long as those ends remains the ought
will remain as well, and when the end changes, the ought will also
change. Thus the Allamah holds that normative conceptions, unlike
objective conceptions, are transitory and impermanent and almost
concludes that moral values cannot be eternal.
Nevertheless, it is to be pointed out
that he maintains that there are certain normative principles which are
immutable, which are five or six and these are permanent and the rest of
them are subject to change. The principles which he regards as permanent
are not of much relevance here, like the principle of necessity in
general, the principle of employment and other similar things whose
discussion will be fruitless here.
Will and Natural Urge
An explanation that is necessary here
is that his application of the principle of employment to all animate
beings is not acceptable. In my footnotes to the chapter I have
discussed the issue in a manner which does not assume such a
generalization. It is not even true of man in all his voluntarily acts
but only of some of his voluntarily actions which are performed
thoughtfully. It is here that the issues of moral imperative and the
rational character of what is moral and immoral arise.
The acts of immature persons, like
infants taking milk, are rather derived from instinct. Elsewhere I have
drawn a distinction between urge and will. The animal, contrary to what
is said loosely that an animal is that which moves voluntarily, acts
according to inclination and urge. In a mature human being there is a
relation between will and reason on the one hand and between inclination
or appetite and reason on the other. Urge is a passive state. In an
animal or man that acts under urge, the greater the influence of urge
the lesser is the role of thought, consciousness and reason and the
action takes an involuntary form. For example, when man sees food, he
feels inclined towards it and it is as if there were something external
that draws him towards itself. On the contrary, when man acts according
to his will, he withdraws from what is external to his being and his
decision arises from his inner being. For example, if he has feels an
inclination for a certain kind of food, he thinks over its consequences
and then decides to take some other food for which he feels a lesser
inclination.
He controls himself by his will and it
is his will which enables him to dissociate himself from that which is
external to his being. Hence will is identical with freedom. Reason and
will liberate man from the tyranny of urges and make him rely upon
himself. Of course, sometimes both inclination and will may be present.
That is, one may be inclined towards something which may be the object
of one's will due to the judgment of reason.
Q: Is will totally absent in cases
where there is an inclination, or is it only weak?
A: Will is there, but it is weak. What I want to point out is that will
and inclination are two separate things. To the extent that man is
subject to inclination, his will is proportionately weak. I do not agree
with Mulls Sadra (though elsewhere he has expressed an opposite
opinion), Mulls Had! Sabzawari and Ibn Sina in considering inclination
and will as one thing. Elsewhere they, including even Ibn Sina, have
drawn a distinction between the two. Will is the state of
self-possession of the soul, a state of resolution, where reason is
involved and rational calculations are made and the judgment of reason
prevails.
Moral imperatives relate to man as a
rational being (in the same way as early Muslim Philosophers consider
them as part of practical reason), not to the soul from a practical
aspect. Moral approval and disapproval are judgments of practical reason
(the contemplative faculty which comprehends universals) from the aspect
of the government of the body. Otherwise moral norms are irrelevant to
animals or to man from the viewpoint of not being subject to the
judgments of reason.
Metaphorical ideas are exclusive to
man. His thought has reached the point where he can apply the term for
something to another thing. For instance, he sees the moon and then sees
a human being possessing beauty to whom he is drawn. He applies the term
for the former to the latter and transfers to the latter his feelings
evoked by the moon. This act signifies man's developed nature and no
animal is capable of such an act.
This act is a kind of make up and adornment; i.e. man observes a kind of
beauty in someone and then he adds to it by supplementing accidental
graces, while he knows that these graces do no belong to that person but
are charms borrowed from extraneous colour, water, and line but which
heighten his feelings of attraction towards that person. This is what
happens in metaphorical and poetical expressions. When the poet refers
to something with metaphors, that thing assumes a greater charm in his
sight, as in the case of Rudaki who wrote those verses for the Samanid
prince using those metaphors for Bukhara. Bukhara remained what it was
but he projected the city in such charming terms that they moved the
prince. These are miracles of the human mind.
Q: Is this the Pavlovian conditioned
reflex?
A: No. Pavlovian conditioned reflex relates to the materialist approach
to perception (not to normative concepts) which tries to give a
materialist interpretation to human thought. Pavlov talks of involuntary
human reflexes. The issue of conditioned reflex or association of ideas
is different from the issue of values and metaphor. In the latter there
is no succession and association. Here one sees something as something
else. That is, he joins it to the other and applies the definition of
one thing to another thing. There is no succession of ideas as in
association. In metaphor there is a simultaneous unification of two
things, not a succession of several things. This is what gives the power
of passion and pathos to elegies. Thus one of the objections against the
Allamah's view is that he generalizes the faculty of normative
formulation to all animate beings, whereas it is exclusive to man and
that too to his practical reason.
Early Muslim philosophers defined
practical wisdom, which includes ethics, as the science of man's
voluntary actions in respect of how they ought to be and how they can be
best and most perfect. This definition given by early Muslim
philosophers is somewhat similar to that of theoretical wisdom which
deals with the most perfect order and the question whether or not the
existing order is the best and most perfect order possible. This
question however relates to whether something exists or not, and in the
discussion of man's voluntary acts the question relates to how something
ought to be and how it can be most perfect.
According to modern philosophers ethics
deals with the question, How should one live one's life, i.e. it does
not deal with how men live but with how they should live. This almost
amounts to the same thing with certain added qualifications. One relates
to universality. When the early Muslim philosophers defined ethics as a
science of man's voluntary acts they meant a universal prescription for
all human beings, not for any particular person.
The other point that should be mentioned here is that when modern
philosophers hold that ethics deals with how one should live one's life,
a qualification is to added here-and they often add it themselves, thus
coming closer to the viewpoint of ancient philosophers-stating that what
is meant is a life imbued with sublimity and sanctity. The meaning of
ethics is loaded with a sense of sublimity and sanctity, or value in
contemporary terms.
Another point whose mention here is not without benefit is that when it
said that ethics is the science of how one must live one's life, that
includes behavior and habit, that is, what kind of conduct and habits
one must have to lead a worthy life.
Another point that is mentioned
nowadays, which is also found in our philosophy, is that ethics deals
only with how man should live and it is assumed that man's nature is
already known, and it is with the knowledge of this nature that the
question of how he must live so that his life possesses sublimity and
sanctity arises. As we know, the existentialists have certain views
about the fundamentality of existence (Mulla Sadra's philosophy is also
based on the fundamentally of existence) and they hold man to be a
potential and indeterminate being.
That is, his essence is not
predetermined and it is man's acts which form his habits and these
habits constitute man's identity and essence. Man does not have an
essence apart from his habits and they constitute the substantial
actuality of man's existence. It is his habits and traits which make and
determine man's being. More precisely, ethics is not only the science of
how one should live but the science of what one should become. When we
talk of ethics as the science of how one should live, it is assumed that
we know what we are and then go one to discuss how man with his fixed
nature and essence, which is the same in all men, is to live. But if we
hold that habits constitute the essence of man then ethics will take a
new dimension. If man can shape his reality with his morals and habits,
then his inner being and essence will change and accordingly ethics
assumes a more profound meaning.
Men have the same form, but from the
spiritual viewpoint their reality depends on their morals and habits.
Hence the definition of `man' may apply to some persons in respect of
form while in respect of their inner being the term `animal' may be true
of them.
With this definition of practical wisdom let us follow up the foregoing
discussion. We said that the issue of moral imperatives signifies man's
relation to a certain act and stems from his feeling. That is man's
nature seeks certain goals and in consonance with those ends certain
feelings emerge in his conscious faculty. He desires what his nature
seeks, and this finally leads him to declare, `I like that thing' and
`It is good.'
Bertrand Russell and others hold-and
Allamah Tabatabai's views lead to the same conclusion-that there can be
no objective criterion for ethics. For instance, when I say that
something is good, it means I like it, and my liking it does not mean
that somebody else should also like it. Others may like something else.
Those who lived in the past regarded what they liked as good, while
today people regard something else as good.
Here a question arises: How can ethical issues be demonstrated?, How can
we argue as to what is good and what is bad? The Allamah is of the view
that these are indemonstrable, for normative matters cannot be proven.
We can only test them on the basis of utility (futility). That is, the
mind's normative formulations are meant to achieve certain goals and if
they do not help one reach them they are invalid.
Moral issues cannot be tested except
through the test of utility. They are not objective matters that can be
proven by experiment or reasoning. They can be proven neither be
deduction nor by the empirical method. In deduction the premises are
based on self evident-principles, or on empirical experience, whereas
practical wisdom is concerned with the concept of good and bad and these
concepts are derive from ought and ought not, which in their turn depend
upon likes and dislikes, which are not identical in all people and vary
according to their personal situation, interests, pursuits and their
attachments to various creeds, groups, and nations. Therefore, every
individual and groups likes certain things and therefore moral values
are inevitably subjective and relative. Hence moral concepts are not
objective issues susceptible to logical proof or deductive or inductive
methods.
Three Ethical Theories
Bertrand Russell is one of the thinkers
who arrived at the same conclusion through his philosophy of logical
analysis. In his book, A History of Western Philosophy, while examining
Plato's conception of justice and Trasymachus's famous objection against
it, that justice is nothing but the interests of the powerful, Russell
is of the view that this is the basic problem of politics and ethics: is
there any criterion iii ethics to distinguish between good and bad
except that which is meant by those who use these terms?
If there is no such criterion then most
of Trasymachus's conclusions will inescapable. But how can one say that
such a criterion exists? Elsewhere Russell says that the difference
between Plato and Trasymachus is very important. Plato thinks that he
can prove that his idea of republic is good. A democrat who accepts the
objectivity of ethics may think that he can prove the Republic to be
immoral; but anyone who agrees with Trasymachus will say: There is no
question of proving or disproving; the only question is whether you like
or not.
If you do, it is good for you; if you
do not it is bad for you. It is like matters of taste; one may like a
certain kind of food and say that this food is good and others may like
another kind and say that, that food is good. There is no absolute good
to compare other goods with. He further says that if you like it, it is
good for you; if you do not, it is bad for you. If some like it and some
don't the matter cannot be decided by reason, but only by force. That
which is said that justice belongs to the powerful, that is because when
some people like something and others don't, those who have greater
power impose their wishes on others by force and that becomes law.
The gist of Russell's statements is
that the concepts of good and bad indicate the relation between man and
the thing in question. If this relation is one of liking it is good and
if it is one of dislike then it is bad. If it is neither liked nor
disliked, then it neither good nor evil. We have written that the answer
to Russell is that first we have to trace the roots of why man likes
something and dislikes something else. Man likes anything that serves
the purpose of life even if from a particular aspect. In other words,
nature always moves towards its perfection and in order to impel man to
carry out that which must be accomplished through his will and choice it
has placed desire, liking and love in him in the same way that it has
informed him with the notions of good and evil. As nature moves towards
individual perfection and expediency, it also moves towards the
perfection of the species as well. Basically the individual's perfection
is not separable from the perfection of his species. The individual's
perfection lies in that of the species, and inevitably a kind of likes
equally shared by all individuals take shape equally in all individuals.
These similar, uniform, universal and absolute likes constitute the
universal criterion of morality.
Justice and other moral values are the
ends towards which nature moves for the perfection of the kind. In order
to attain such ends through voluntary action it creates a liking for
these ends in all individuals. By virtue of that liking the oughts and
ought nots appear in the form of a series of universal imperatives in
die soul. Accordingly, to have a universal criterion in ethics it is not
necessary to consider good and evil objective entities like whiteness
and blackness, roundness and squareness. Russell considers the ego in "I
like it," as an ego solely concerned with its material and physical
interests, not as an ego which is concerned with its spiritual nobility
or as an ego that is concerned with the interests of its kind.
Here we will mention two or three
hypotheses and then try to substantiate the above remarks. First we have
to see whether or not there actually exists a set of common, universal
and permanent imperatives in man's soul (this minor premise has to be
derived through experience). That is, do there exist in the human
conscience any notions commonly held by all individuals in addition to
the temporary, particular, and individual notions of good and bad? I
mean those universal imperatives that are devoid of personal preferences
and tastes in which all that is relevant is personal interest. Do such
imperatives exist according to which man makes judgments occasionally
even despite his personal preferences?
One may say I don't know the analysis
of such an issue, but I know this much that I and all people have
certain universal precepts according to which we judge, for instance,
that honesty is good in itself, whatever the basis of this judgment, or
that it is good to return kindness for kindness. This judgment
transcends all personal interests, and one cannot deny if someone says
that a kindness returned for kindness a thousand years ago is
praiseworthy or that anyone who ever returned evil for kindness is
blameworthy. Undeniably there are two kinds of acts involved here; one
act is praiseworthy and valuable for man and the other is worthless or
has a negative value.If one were to compare with a free mind two kinds
of characters, such as Abu Dharr and Mu'awiyah, in order to make a
judgment concerning them, he will see that Abu Dharr was a man to whom
Mu'awiyah was ready to give everything to buy his loyalty and to make
him relinquish his higher principles. He did not surrender to the
devices of Mu'awiyah who had made everything a means of attaining his
ambitions.
Here one naturally commends the former
and condemns the latter. The same test may be applied in case of other
characters and the result will invariably be the same. We are not
concerned with the opinion that all judgments concerning goodness and
badness derive from likes or dislikes. That may be true, but firstly we
want to see whether or not there exist common and universal judgments.
Secondly, if they do, how can we justify them? Are they justifiable
according to what the A(lamah and Russell have said? We said that there
are two kinds of ought and ought not; one kind is particular and
individual which we regularly come across in everyday life. For
instance, I ought to eat such food, I ought to wear such a dress, and so
on. The second kind of imperatives, of which examples were cited, is
universal in nature. Now the question is what is the basis of such
universal judgments? If we do not agree with the theologians in
considering goodness and badness as objective attributes and hold that
these notions ultimately pertain to man's relation to a thing, then how
can we justify universal moral judgments?
First Theory
There are three kinds of justification.
According to the first, man has certain urges which serve to fulfill his
individual needs. For instance when hungry, he feels an urge for food.
Man has also another kind of urges which are species oriented. That is,
man may desire something which is not for his individual benefit but for
the sake of others. For instance, man does like others to, go hungry in
the same way that he does not want to remain hungry himself. God has
created man such. If we accept this justification, then the Allamah's
view becomes implausible for he holds that man's motives are consonant
with his natural urges. That is, man's motives are subject to his
individual nature. He holds the principle of employment to be a
universal principle and this conflicts with the foregoing justification.
For according to it a self-seeking act is ordinary and mediocre, but
when the same act is formed for the sake of others it is considered to
be sublime and sacred. Here serving others is a criterion of sanctity
and self-seeking a criterion of its absence.
If an act is meant for one's own
benefit it is for individual benefit and if it is for others it is for
mankind in general, and such an act is moral in nature. Thus the
criterion of the moral or immoral character of an act depends in one
sense on its being for one's own self or for the sake of others, that
is, in its purpose being individual or universal. It is universality
that gives value to an act although in other respects it is no different
from an act done for personal and individual motives. Accordingly, it is
true that `It is good' means `I like it', but sometimes I may like
something for myself and sometime for the sake of others. Inevitably,
what I like for others and for their benefit takes a universal aspect
(for it is not for the sake of any particular persons among others) and
is permanent value. Accordingly, moral acts are also universal and
permanent. A moral act is one that stems from liking others' good and
benefit. This makes ethics universal and permanent. This approach to
ethics also justifies certain cases like lying for the sake of some
beneficial purpose. Why is truthfulness good? Because the general good
lies in truthfulness. If truthfulness should prove to be injurious then
it is immoral, for truthfulness is not good in itself.
The criterion of goodness is service to
others. In cases where truthfulness amounts to betraying others, it
becomes bad. Here ethics assumes solely asocial dimension (nowadays
`ethics' is usually considered to mean social ethics). Accordingly, we
arrive at a conclusion that there is a universal principle in ethics
which is eternal and permanent, although. it may have changing
instances. There is a diference between the impermanence of an ethical
principle and the impermanence of its instances. The question is whether
moral principles are permanent or not. Accordingly to our justification
moral acts are reducible to one immutable principle, that is, service to
others.
Q: In fact this principle is a kind of
hypothesis, that is, it is assumed that ethics is service to others,
then it is declared that it is universal and permanent principle.
However, someone may make some other assumption and hold that ethics
means self-help in which case he would produce another immutable and
universal principle.
A: You have missed the first premises. As I said there are certain
issues on which all men make the same judgment. That-is, all viewpoints
are identical about a certain act. Besides, all consider it a valuable
act. Service to others is something about which I and you have the same
feeling. Moreover, I view it as something sublime and above personal
interests in the same way that you view it.
Then we posed the question as to how such a universal principle could
exist when values like goodness and badness stem from likes and
dislikes, which are changeable. Yes, if all likes were rooted in selfish
motives, as Russell believes and as can be inferred from the Allamah's
words, then such an objection could be valid, but not if it is held that
man is created with two kinds of motives.
Q: The word `others' in the foregoing discussion is somewhat ambiguous.
It seems that it cannot be taken in an absolute sense. For example, a
soldier who fights for the interest of foreigners, fights for others but
his act is not ethical.
A: By `others' I mean mankind. That is, an act that is for the sake of
mankind, not for the benefit of one individual and to the detriment
another. We have an individual ego as well as a collective ego, which
includes a person's family and relations (every tyrant is a benefactor
for his family). Here the concept of the self is extended. Moral acts go
beyond the limit of the ego and sometimes transcend even the domain of
humanity (being for the sake of God). Morality begins where the confines
of the ego are transcended.
However, this theory cannot be accepted due to the objections that arise
against it on the basis of the Allamah's theory, which cannot be set
aside so simply by conceding that there is a disharmony between man's
conscious being and his individual nature. For that would mean that
individual nature moves in one direction and his conscious being in
another, solely pursuing the perfection of species without attending to
individual perfection. The result would be that man's conscious being,
which is at the service of his nature-and so it must be-will be brought
into the service of the species without any concern for the individual's
interests.
Q: On the basis of what you have said, service to the species is also
part of man's nature?
A: No. Service to species is not part of individual nature, but man
takes pleasure in helping others and that is not without reason. For
individual nature cannot derive pleasure without moving towards
perfection. According to Ibn Sina if man feels pleasure, it does not
mean that nafure and feeling move on different independent courses.
Rather it is nature that achieves its
perfection, and when that happens pleasure is felt if it is perceived
through knowledge by presence. That is, the very movement of nature from
potentiality to perfection is identical with pleasure when perceived
through knowledge by presence. Pleasure is nature's attainment to
perfection when it is perceivable. It is impossible for man to take
pleasure without nature attaining a perfection.
Second Theory
There is another theory advocated by
some contemporary thinkers. According to it, it is impossible for man to
desire anything that is unrelated to his own self. Whatever the
individual enjoys doing is ultimately related to his own self. However,
man has two selves: an individual self and a collective self.
Biologically man is an individual, but from the social point of view he
has also a social self. The other point that Durkheim and others have
made-and Allamah Tabatabai has derived it from the Qur'an without being
aware of their ideas-is that society has also a self and personality
which is real and objective.
Society is not a sum total of
individuals in the sense of a numericat totality, and it is not the case
that it is individuals who are fundamental and they merely influence
society. Rather, society is a real and unique compound of individuals
(of course, it is different from natural compounds in which individual
elements totally lose their independent identity).
In this kind of composition,
individuals, who retain their separate wills and independence, share in
a single self. Every member has a feeling of possessing two selves;
sometime it is conscious of the individual self and sometime of the
social self. According to some sociologists society reaches
self-consciousness in the individual; that is, society is conscious of
its being in the individual being.
The sufis and gnostics hold a similar
view. William James also has a similar view. With certain a difference
the gnostics believe in a kind of unity among the souls and hold that
the real self is the universal self. They say that man mistakenly
considers his own as a distinct self and they ultimately reduce the real
self to God, believing that the individual self is nothing more than a
manifestation of that real self. It is as if there were a universal
spirit that reveals itself in different individuals and all these selves
derive from the one Divine self. William James also arrived at the same
conclusion through psychological experiences. He holds that there is an
inner connection between individual selves of which they are often
unaware. One who purifies his self can get to know the contents of
consciousness of other selves through that inner connection (like wells
that are connected to each other under the ground while they are
separate on the surface).
This connection stems from their union
with the Divine source. But sociologists are of the view that
individuals on merging in society develop a social self which is a real
cultural entity. Sometime man is conscious of this self which is not his
individual self but a universal social self. Accordingly man's has two
kinds of activities those motivated by individual motives and others
prompted by social motives. According to the first theory man has dual
motives, one of which is directed to serves his own self and the other
to serve others. According to the second theory man has two selves and
two sets of feelings: the individual self and feeling which serve the
individual self and another self and feeling which serve the collective
self. A moral act is one which is not motivated by the individual self
but by the collective self. The collective self is permanent and
universal. The conclusion that follows from the second theory is that
every action that stems from the collective self is a moral act and that
which stems from the individual self is not moral in nature. Of course,
the instances of this principle may vary, but in any case this can be a
universal and permanent principle.
Third Theory
There is a third theory according to
which it is impossible that man should do anything which is unrelated to
the domain of his self and has no relation to his personality, being
exclusively in the service of something external and without being
related to the realm of his being. Man, however, has two selves, higher
and lower. That is, man is a being with dual aspects. In one aspect he
is an animal like other animals and in the other he has a higher
reality. It is amazing why Allamah Tabatabai did not advance such a
view, for it is consistent with his own principles including those
relating to ethics.
When we speak of `man's nature,' we mean man's reality, not merely his
physical nature. Man has an ontological reality and his emotional being
is subordinate to that reality. The ontological being of man one plane
consists of his animal being and on a higher plane of his spiritual
being. Man completely realizes this higher self in himself or rather
considers it his more original self. When animal needs conflict with his
judgment based on reason and will and he wishes to subject his animal
needs to his reason there may be two kinds of consequences. At times he
succeeds and at other time he fails. For instance, in the matter of food
and its quantity, reason has its own judgment whereas his appetite
requires something else.
When man yields to his appetite he has
a feeling of defeat, and when he overcomes his appetite he feels
victorious, while in reality he has neither been defeated by anyone nor
has he been victorious over anyone. Here one aspect of his existence is
dominated r by another aspect. Apparently, he should feel either
defeated or victorious in both cases, for both belong to the realm of
his existence. But practically we see that it is not so. When reason
dominates over appetite, he has a feeling of victory and when appetite
overcomes reason he feels defeated.
That is because his real self is the one associated with reason and
will, and his animal aspect constitutes his lower self. Actually the
lower self forms a prelude to his real self. If we believe in such a
duality in man's being then we can justify ethical principles in the
following manner.
Man has certain perfections by virtue of his spiritual self. These
perfections are real and not conventional, for man is not only body but
soul as well. Any act that is consistent with man's spiritual perfection
is valuable, and any act that is irrelevant to the higher aspect of our
soul is an ordinary and mediocre act.
I agree with the Allamah, Russell, and
others that good and bad, ought and ought-not derive from man's likes
and dislikes. But the question is: the likes or dislikes of which self
are to taken as the criterion, those of the higher self or those of the
lower self? Moral value arises if it is the higher self that likes. This
is the reason why ethics is felt to have a higher station.
That man sees one aspect of his existence and acts pertaining to it as
possessing sublimity is not a mental construct or convention. Rather,
that is because he feels that aspect to be a more perfect and stronger
aspect of his being. All his perfections derive from that aspect of his
existence and its intensity, and all defects derive from its weakness.
In accordance with this approach,
virtues like honesty, truthfulness, kindness, mercy, beneficence and the
like are notions which have affinity to the higher self. The
philosophers have also said that practical wisdom relates to voluntary
acts from the viewpoint of being more perfect and excellent. They relate
the matter ultimately to the soul, and maintain that the human soul
possesses two kind of perfections: theoretical and practical.
Theoretical perfection of soul lies in the knowledge of the realities of
the world and the higher virtues are considered practical perfection of
the soul. That is, they develop the soul practically and brings about a
harmony in its relation with the body and pave the way for the real
perfection of the soul. Here we reach a most significant Islamic
principle which has not been discussed by the philosophers. That
principle is as follows: man has an innate nobility and sublimity which
is the same as his spiritual being and the Divine breath.
Subconsciously he senses that dignity
within himself. In confrontation with actions and habits he ascertains
whether they are compatible with his innate nobility or not. When he
feels that there is a compatibility and harmony, he regards it as good
and virtuous, otherwise as evil and vicious. In the same way that
animals are guided by instinct to what is beneficial or harmful for
them, the human soul has perfections transcending nature and some
actions and habits are compatible with those perfections.
Universal values relating to good and
evil, oughts and ought-hots may be justified in the following manner:
Human beings are created alike in respect of that in which their
spiritual perfection lies, with similar and uniform likes and
viewpoints. Although physically and naturally all men live in different
conditions and situations and with varying physical needs, but they are
equally situated in respect to their spiritual perfection. Inevitably,
in that domain likes and dislikes and notions of what is good and evil
assume a uniform, universal and permanent aspect.
All moral virtues, whether individual
or social, such as patience and the like, can be explained from this
viewpoint. The two theories mentioned earlier can explain only social
values like self-sacrifice, helping others, etc., but they cannot
explain values like patience, fortitude and so on. The last theory on
the contrary can explain all moral values. Though I agree with the view
that all perceptions of good and evil signify a thing's relation with
its perfection, nevertheless such perceptions of good and evil can be
universal and permanent.
Translated by A. N.
Baqirshahi |