Zawahir
al-Qur'an: The Authority of the Book's Literal Meanings
by Ayatullah al-`Uzma al-Sayyid Abu
al-Qasim al-Khu'i
Translated from the Arabic by Mujahid
Husayn
The author is one of
the maraji (legal authorities) of the Shi'i world and one of the
most eminent figures in the world of contemporary Islamic scholarship.
The translation given here is that of two chapters from his work on
Qur'anic exegesis, al-Bayan fi tafsir al-Qur'an : "hujjiyat
zawahir al-Qur'an," (the authority of the Qur'anic zawahir),
and "usul al-tafsir" (the principles of exegesis).
Two terms need to be
understood in regard to the Qur'anic meaning: nusus (sing,
nass) and zawahir (sing. zahir). By nusus is meant
those Quranic texts which are absolutely clear, being of a single
meaning, about which there is no ambiguity whatsoever. The term
zawahir refers to those meanings which are the most obvious,
although the text may have another, less probable, meaning besides its
apparent sense. Although zawahir has been translated here as
'literal meanings' which applies to nusus as well the difference
between nusus and zawahir should be noted.
There is no doubt
that the Prophet (S) did not innovate any special method for conveying
his message; he spoke to the people by applying the modes of expression
to which they were habituated. He brought the Qur'an to them that they
may understand it, contemplate over its verses, follow its commands and
refrain from what it prohibits. This message often recurs in the verses
of the Qur'an:
What, do they not
contemplate over the Qur'an? Or is it that there are locks upon their
hearts? (47:24)
Indeed we have
struck for the people in this Qur'an every manner of similitude; haply
they will remember. (39:27)
Truly it is the
revelation of the Lord of all Being, brought down by the Trustworthy
Spirit upon thy heart in a clear Arabic language, that thou mayest be
one of the warners.
(26:192-195)
This is an
exposition for mankind, and a guidance and admonition for the
God-fearing. (3:138)
Thus have We made
it easy on your tongue, that haply they may remember.
(44:58)
And We have made
the Qur'an easy for remembrance. Is there any one that will remember?
(54:17)
And what, do they
not contemplate over the Qur'an? And had it been from someone other than
God, they would have found in it much inconsistency.
(4:82)
Apart from these
verses, there are other verses as well which prove the obligatoriness
(wujub) of acting in accordance with the contents of the Qur'an and
the necessity of accepting the literal meanings of its verses.
Following arguments
prove the authoritativeness (hujjiyyah) of the literal meanings
of the Qur'an as comprehended by the Arabs.
1.
The Qur'an's revelation as a proof of prophethood and the Prophet's (S)
challenge to all mankind to bring a single surah of its kind,
both imply that the Arabs used to understand the literal meaning of the
Qur'an. Had the Qur'an spoken in riddles, it wouldn't have been correct
to challenge them regarding it, nor its miraculous character would have
been proved to them, because they could not have understood it. It would
have also contradicted the purpose for which the Qur'an was revealed and
its invitation to mankind to believe in it.
2.
There are ample traditions commanding adherence to `the two Weighty
Things' (al-Thaqalayn, which are the Qur'an and the Ahl al
Bayt,) that the Prophet (S) left behind for the Muslims. Here,
evidently, the meaning of adhering to the Qur'an is to grasp its message
and to act in accordance with it, and there is no other meaning apart
from this.
3.
There are mutawatir traditions (i.e. traditions narrated by so
many different chains of transmission as to establish their authenticity
beyond doubt) which order that traditions be checked against the Qur'an;
those which contradict it should be rejected as invalid or false, as
those whose acceptance is prohibited, because they are not the words of
( the Prophet [ S ] or) the Imams (A). These traditions categorically
prove the canonical authority of the literal meanings of the Qur'an,
i.e. the meanings as understood by the ordinary speakers of the language
familiar with the literary (fasih) Arabic language. To this
category also belong those traditions which order the correlation of
contractual conditions with the Qur'an and rejection of those opposing
it.
4.
The arguments of the Imams (A) regarding some rules of the Shari'ah, as
well as other things, in which they have argued by applying the verses
of the Qur'an. Following are some examples.
a.
There is the exposition of al-'Imam al-Sadiq (A) when Zurarah questioned
him, "How do you understand that mash, (the ritual wiping, of the
head or the feet during wudu') of (only) a part of the head is
required?" The Imam (A) replied, "From the ba'," in the verse
b.
Another example, is his prohibiting Hisham al-Dawaniqi from accepting a
slanderer's report, because such a person is a fasiq (evildoer),
and the Qur'an says:
If an ungodly (fasiq)
person comes to you with a tiding, verify it
... (49:6)
c. Among the
arguments is his (A) warning a person who had prolonged his stay in the
toilet to listen to prohibited music, on the excuse that he had not
intentionally come for listening to it, by observing, "Have you not
heard the words of God Almighty,
Surely the hearing
and sight and the heart will all be questioned?" (17:36)
d.
Another instance is the Imam's telling his (A) son, Isma'il, "When
believers give evidence before you, endorse its verity," quoting as a
proof the verse:
He (the Prophet
(S) believes in God and believes the believers. (9:61)
e.
Concerning the validity of a slave being a muhallil for a woman
divorced thrice, he (A) observes: "He is considered (fit to be) a
husband, and God Almighty says in the Qur'an:
... Unless she
marries another husband .... (2:230)
f.
Another such argument is where the Imam (A) observes that a triple
divorcee will not become halal again (for the husband who
divorces her) through a temporary marriage (mut`ah), because God
Almighty says:
Thus if he
divorces her, there is no blame on the two if they reunite.(2:230)
And there is no
divorce in mut`ah
g.
Similarly, concerning a person who had tripped and lost a nail and then
bandaged the toe, he (A) said: "A person's duty in this and other
similar instances is known from the Qur'an, which declares:
God has not
ordained any hardship for you in the religion. "(22:78)
Then he (A) said:
"Perform the mash over it" (the bandage).
h.
The Imam (A) brings proof regarding the permissibility of marriage with
a certain woman by quoting this verse from the Qur'an:
And other than
those mentioned (as prohibited) have been made halal for you. (4:24)
i.
Of such arguments is the one of the Imam (A) concerning the invalidity
of a slave's marriage, because the Qur'an says:
An owned slave
having no authority over anything
.... (16:75)
j.
The Imam (A) cites the following verse from the Qur'an as a proof of the
permissibility of (eating the flesh of) certain species of animals:
Say: I do not end
in that which has been revealed to me anything forbidden for an eater to
eat .... (6:45)
There are many other
similar arguments of the Imams (A) that are based on Qur'anic verses,
and these are scattered through the different chapters of fiqh and other
subjects.
Arguments against the authority of the
Zawahir
A group of
traditionists have rejected the authority of the literal meanings of the
Qur'an, refusing to act on them for following reasons.
1. The
understanding of the Qur'an is limited to a selected few:
They argue that the
ability to understand the Qur'an is limited to those who have been
addressed by it. The protagonists of this view rely as their proof on a
number of traditions concerning this issue, such as the mursal
tradition of Shu`ayb ibn Anas narrated from al-'Imam al Sadiq (A),
reporting that the Imam (A) said to Abu Hanifah:
"Are you the faqih of
the people of Iraq?" He replied: "Yes, I am." The Imam (A) said: "On
what basis do you pronounce your fatwa for them?" He replied: "On
the basis of the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet." The Imam
said: "O Abu Hanifah, do you comprehend the Qur'an the way it should be
comprehended, and do you recognize the nasikh and the mansukh?"
He replied, "Yes." The Imam (A) said: "O Abu Hanifah, you certainly
profess having knowledge! Woe to you! God has not kept this knowledge
except with the people of the Book and they on whom it has been sent
down (i.e. the Ahl al-Bayt). Woe to you! This knowledge is with none
except the chosen of our Prophet's (S) progeny, and God has not
bequeathed a word to you from His Book."
The following
tradition is narrated by Zayd al-Shahham in this relation:
Qatadah visited Abu
Ja'far (A) and the Imam (A) asked him: "Are you the faqih of the people
of Basrah?" He replied: "This is what they think." The Imam (A) then
said: "I have come to know that you expound (tufassiru) the
Qur'an." He replied: "Yes, I do." (The tradition continues until where)
the Imam (A) said:"O Qatadah, if you have expounded the Qur'an in
accordance with your own views, then you have certainly perished and
have also caused others to perish, and if you have expounded it in
accordance with the views of others, then you have perished and have
caused others to perish. Woe to you! No one knows the Qur'an except
those who have been addressed by it."
Answer:
The meaning of these and similar traditions is that the comprehension of
the Qur'an mentioned in them implies comprehending it completely,
knowing both its literal and hidden meanings, along with its nasikh
and mansukh, and this is limited to those who have been
addressed by it. The first tradition explicitly conveys this meaning.
Thus the question asked in this tradition was about the full
comprehension of the Qur'an and about differentiating between the
nasikh and the mansukh. The Imam's (A) censure of Abu Hanifah
was due to his claim of possessing that knowledge. As to the second
tradition, it contains the word `tafsir' which means `unveiling'
(kashf al-qina'), and therefore it does not include the
acceptance of literal meanings, because they are not concealed so as to
require unveiling. This is also borne out by the explicit traditions
mentioned earlier that understanding of the Qur'an is not limited to the
Infallible Imams (A). Moreover the Imam's statement in the mursal
tradition (of Shu'ayb ibn Anas) in which he says
(God
Almighty has not bequeathed to you a word from His Book), also proves
the same, for it means that God has chosen the Awsiya' (A) of His
prophet (S) for inheriting the Qur'an, and this is the meaning of the
verse.
Then We bequeathed
the Book on those of Our servants We chose ....(35:32)
Therefore, the
knowledge of the Qur'an's reality is exclusively with the Imams (A) and
others do not have a share in it. This is the meaning of the mursal
tradition (of Shu'ayb ibn Anas); otherwise, would it he reasonable
to think that Abu Hanifah did not comprehend anything of the Qur'an
including
and other similar other verses which are explicit in their meaning?
There is really a very large number of traditions which prove that such
complete knowledge is particular to the Imams (A), and some of them have
been mentioned earlier.
2. The prohibition
of tafsir bi al-ray:
It is argued that the
acceptance of the Qur'an's meanings is tantamount to tafsir bi
al-ray (interpreting the Qur'an according to subjective opinion),
and there are mutawattir traditions, narrated both by Sunnis and
Shi'ah, which forbid such a practice.
Answer:
As said, `tafsir' implies unveiling, and this does not include
the taking of literal meanings of the verses, because such a meaning is
not something hidden that has to be uncovered. Moreover, even of we
should consider this as tafsir, it is not tafsir bi al-ray
for it to come in the purview of the mutawatir traditions
forbidding it. On the contrary, it is a tafsir in accordance with
the common usage of words. Therefore, one who, for example, translates a
sermon of Nahj al-balaghah in accordance with the ordinarily
understood meanings of its words and by using the indications available
in the sermon and outside it, his doing so will not be considered
tafsir bi al-ray, and al-'Imam al-Sadiq (A) points this out when he
says: "People have solely perished on account of the mutashabih,
because they could not comprehend its meaning and reality, interpreting
its meaning in accordance with their views and seeking thereby to
relieve themselves of the need to ask the Awsiya', who could have
informed them." It is probable that the meaning of tafsir bi al-ray
is independence from referring to the Imams (A) in giving fatwa,
although they are companions to the Qur'an in regard to the
obligation of adherence to the two and as the ultimate authority.
Therefore, if a
person acts in accordance with the general statements (al-`umum)
of the Qur'an without accepting the views of the Imams (A) in
determining and limiting (taqyid and takhsis) the
jurisdiction of these statements, it will be considered as tafsir bi
al-ra'y. On the whole, the adoption of literal meanings after a due
search for internal and external indications (qara'in) present in
the Qur'an and the traditions, or for a rational proof, can not only be
not considered tafsir bi al ra'y, it cannot be considered `tafsir'
as such. As mentioned earlier, the aforementioned traditions indicate
that the Qur'an should be referred to and acted upon, and it is evident
that such reference implies the acceptance of its literal meanings.
Accordingly, when the relevant traditions are reconciled, tafsir bi
al-ray ought to be understood as implying something other than
acting in accordance with the literal meanings.
3. The mystery of
the meanings of the Qur'an:
It is said that the
Qur'an contains sublime and mysterious meanings and this quality of it
is a hurdle in comprehending its meanings and fully grasping its import.
To be certain, there are some books of the ancients whose meanings
cannot be comprehended except by knowledgeable experts; accordingly,
how could the Qur'an, which contains all the knowledge regarding both
the past and the future, be understood?
Answer:
It is true that the Qur'an certainly contains the knowledge of the past
and the future, and comprehending it from the Qur'an is doubtlessly
restricted to the Ahl al-Bayt (A). However, this does not contravene
the fact that the Qur'an has literal meanings understandable by anyone
acquainted with the Arabic language and its rules, which one may act
upon once they become clear after due research for supporting
indications.
4. The knowledge
that the literal meaning is not intended:
It may be said that
we know in a mujmal way (i.e. without knowing all the specific
details) that there exist restrictive proofs (mukhassisat and
muqayyidat) which limit the application of the general statements
(`umumat and itlaqat) of the Qur'an. This means that some of
its literal meanings are certainly not what are intended, for such
general statements have been restricted in their jurisdiction. However,
those literal meanings which are not intended are not specifically known
so as to enable us to confine us to those particular instances. As a
result of this, all the literal meanings of the Qur'an and all its
general statements become indistinct (mujmal) incidentally,
though they are not in fact such essentially. Consequently, it is not
valid to act according to them, as a measure of caution against acting
in violation of the real (commands of God).
Answer:
This mujmal knowledge (that there are some general statements
whose literal meaning is not the intended one) can act as a hindrance to
accepting all the literal meanings when one resolves to act in
accordance with them without a due investigation regarding their real
import. But after the mukallaf (a person responsible for his
religious duties) investigates and discovers such instances to the
extent of gaining a mujmal knowledge of their presence in the
Qur'an, the hindrance posed by the prior mujmal knowledge is
removed, and it fails to have any effect. Thereupon, there remains no
hindrance to acting upon the literal meanings. The same thing is true
of the Sunnah, where we also know that there are proofs which limit the
jurisdiction of its general statements. Hence, had the mujmal
knowledge (regarding the zawahir of the Qur'an) been a hindrance
in the way of accepting its literal meanings even after such knowledge
is rendered ineffective, it would also be a hindrance in accepting the
literal meanings of traditions. Not only that, it would stop us from
applying the Rule of Bara'ah (the presumption of absence of duty)
in situations where doubts concerning the presence of a duty (al-shubuhat
al-hukmiyyah) arise in the obligatoriness (wujub) or
imperamissibility (hurmah) of something. This because every
mukallaf knows is a mujmal way the presence of compulsory
duties in the Shari'ah, and this mujmal knowledge (in accordance
with the reasoning of the opponents of zawahir) could result in
applying caution (ihtiyat) in all doubtful cases of duties
pertaining to obligations and prohibitions. However, we know for certain
that caution is not wajib in them. It is true that age group of
traditionists have considered caution wajib in cases of doubts
concerning the presence of prohibition (al-shubuhat al-tahrimiyyah) because
they imagined that the traditions ordering restraint and caution prove
restraint and caution in cases of al-shubuhat al-tahrimiyyah.
But this opinion of theirs is not based on the mujmal knowledge
warding the presence of compulsory duties in the Shari'ah, because if it
were so they would have considered caution obligatory in case of doubt
regarding the obligatoriness of something (al-shubuhat al-wujubiyyah)
as well. However, as far as we know, no one has considered caution
compulsory in such cases. The sole secret of caution not being wajib
in these and other similar instances is that mujmal knowledge
is at times `dissolved' as a result of success in acquiring the
knowledge (of specifics), and the dissolution of the mujmal
knowledge renders it ineffective. For a further explanation, the reader
should refer to our book ajwad al-taqrirat.
5. The prohibition
of following the mutashabihat:
The opponents of
acting on the zawahir point out that the Qur'anic `verses forbid
the following of the mutashabihat. God Almighty says:
In it are muhkam
(clear) verses which are the foundation of the Book, and other verses
which are mutashabih. As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they
follow its mutashabih
(ambiguous) verses .... (3:7)
The term
mutashabih also includes literal meanings or, at least, the
possibility of its including literal meanings makes them incapable of
being accepted as authority.
Answer:
The word mutashabih has a perspicuous meaning, and there is no
ambiguity or vagueness in it. It means a word having two or more
meanings that stand in the same degree of nearness in relation to that
word. Thus when such a word is used in a verse, the possibility arises
that any one of these meanings may be actually intended. For this
reason, it is wajib to observe restraint in giving a judgement in
favour of any of the meanings unless there is an indication to specify
it. Accordingly, a word having a single literal meaning is not
considered mutashabih.
If we condescend to
accept that the word mutashabih is itself ambiguous, and that
there exists a possibility of its including literal meanings, our doing
so does not prevent us from acting in accordance with the literal
meanings. This is after the practice of rational persons (sirat al-`uqala)
which sanctions the acceptance of the literal meaning of a speech or
writing. Therefore, a sole possibility is incapable of preventing this
practice from being acted upon, for it requires a categorical proof in
order to do so. Otherwise, this practice will undoubtedly be followed.
For this reason, a master is able to prove his servant's fault if the
latter acts against the literal meanings of the former's speech, and it
is valid for the master to punish him for the violation. Similarly, the
servant may justify himself vis-a-vis his master if he has acted in
accordance with the literal meaning of his master's words where it is
opposed to his real intent. On the whole, this practice is followed in
accepting the literal meanings, unless there exists a categorical proof
against it.
6. The
occurrence of tahrif in the Qur'an:
The occurrence of
tahrif (textual corruption, or loss) in the Qur'an prevents us from
accepting the literal meanings because a possibility of there being,
alongside the literal meanings, helping indications determining their
real intent exists, and these indications might have been lost due to
tahrif
Answer:
We reject the claim of occurrence of tahrif in the Qur'an, and
have earlier presented our argument concerning it.
[1] There we said that the traditions
commanding us to refer to the Qur'an are by themselves a proof negating
tahrif. Even if we condescend to presume the occurrence of
tahrif, we are obliged by these traditions to act in accordance with
the Qur'an even after the presumption of occurrence of tahrif.
The conclusion that follows from this discussion is that it is necessary
to act on the literal meanings of the Qur'an; that the Qur'an is the
basis of the Shari'ah; and that the narrated Sunnah will not be acted
upon when it opposes the Qur'an.
The Methodology of
Tafsir:
`Tafsir'
means the elucidation of the intent of
God Almighty in the Holy Qur'an. Therefore, it is neither permissible in
this regard to rely on conjectures (zunun) or on one's
preferences (istihsan), nor on anything whose validity has not
been established by reason or the Shari'ah. This is because following
conjectures and attributing anything to God without His permission is
forbidden. God Almighty says:
Say: `Has God
permitted you, or do you forge a lie against God?'
(10:59)
And follow not
that of which you have no knowledge. (17:36)
There are other such
verses and traditions that forbid acting without knowledge, and there
are a sufficiently large (mustafidah) number of traditions from
both Sunni and Shi'ah sources forbidding tafsir bi al-ray.
This makes it clear
that it is not valid to follow the tafsir of any exegete,
irrespective of his being rightful in his creed or otherwise, because it
amounts to following conjecture, and conjecture is not a substitute for
knowledge.
The Sources of
Tafsir:
It is necessary for
an exegete to: follow the literal meanings as understood by a
linguistically competent Arab (and we have already explained that
literal meanings are authoritative), or follow the dictates of sound
reason, for reason is an inward authority in the same way as the Prophet
(S) is an outward authority (hujjah), or follow the traditions
established to have been narrated from the Mu'sumun (the Prophet [S],
Fatimah [A] , and the Imams [A] ), because they are the authorities to
be referred to in the religion (al-maraji` fi al-Din). The
Prophet (S) declared the duty of making recourse to them when he said.
Verily, I am leaving
behind two weighty things amongst you: the Book of God and my Family, my
Ahl al-Bayt. If you hold on to them, you will never go astray after me.
[2]
There is no doubt
that the statements of the Imams (A) are established when narrated
through a definite chain of transmission free from doubt. Similarly,
there is no doubt that they are not proved when narrated by a weak (daif)
chain which does not possess the requirements of credibility. Are
their (A) statements proven through a chain creating presumption (tariq
zanni) when supported by a definite proof (dalil qati)? The
scholars differ in this regard.
A doubt is raised
here concerning the authority of khabar al wahid (a tradition
which is not mutawatir) narrated by trustworthy narrators from
the Ma'sumun (A) regarding the tafsir of the Qur'an. The reason offered
is that the implication, of the authority of khabar al-wahid, or
some other proof (dalil) leading to presumption (zann), is
that it is obligatory to follow it in a case when one is ignorant about
the actual law as if the law were known for certain. Such an approach is
applicable nowhere except in regard to a hadith concerning a law of the
Shari'ah or a subject relating to such a law. This condition is at times
not present in a khabar al-wahid narrated from the Ma'sumun (A)
in regard to tafsir (for such traditions may relate to subjects having
no relation whatsoever with the laws of the Shari'ah, such as doctrines,
historical events, etc.).
This objection is
contrary to fact. It has been explained in discussions on usul al-fiqh
that the meaning of the authority (hujjiyyah) of the proofs that
bring only presumption (and not certainty) about the actual fact, is
that such presumptive proofs have been made binding substitutes for
definite proofs by the Lawgiver (this is called certainty through
ta`abbud, i.e. in observance of Divine sanction). Thus, a channel
whose credibility is approved by the Lawgiver's sanction is as good as a
source resulting in certainty, despite the fact that it lacks the
intrinsic capacity to produce certainty. Hence all the effects of
certain knowledge will follow from this channel, and it will be as
correct to report (regarding non-legal matters) on its authority as it
is correct to do so on the basis of actual knowledge; it will not be
considered a statement without knowledge.
We are led to this
conclusion by the practice prevalent among all reasonable persons ( `uqala').
Such persons consider a channel of approved credibility similar to
actual knowledge, without making any difference between the effects of
the rule. For instance, the possession, of a thing by someone is
regarded as a proof of his ownership by the people, despite the fact
that it can give rise only to presumption that the possessor is its
owner, and they allow on its basis all the effects of ownership, and
report without deserving any blame that he is the owner of that thing.
And this common practice has not been disapproved by the Lawgiver.
Of course, it is true
that a trustworthy tradition or any other credible channel should
possess all the conditions of credibility. Among such conditions is that
the tradition should not be of known falsity, because something known to
be false cannot reasonably possess the marks of credibility or enjoy the
Lawgiver's sanction. Therefore, those traditions which are contrary to
consensus or definite Sunnah, or the Qur'an, or the dictates of sound
reason, will certainly not be considered credible, although they may
possess other requirements of credibility. There is also no difference
here between traditions relating to a rule of the Shari'ah and those
relating to non-legal subjects.
The basis of this
argument against the credibility of khabar al wahid is that
however trustworthy a narrator may be, the tradition narrated by him is
not secure from being contrary to the truth, because there is at least a
possibility of his having made a mistake, especially where there are a
large number of links in the chain of transmission. Hence, it is
necessary to have some grounds establishing credibility that remove such
a possibility, making it as if non-existent. However, in the case of
certainty about the falsity of a tradition, which is known to be
contrary to the truth, such a certainty cannot be evaded on the basis of
the Lawgiver's sanction (ta`abbud ), for the intrinsic quality
of certainty is to reveal the truth and its validity is established as
necessary by reason.
Therefore it is
necessary to limit the grounds of the credibility of khabar al-wahid
to those traditions which are not known to be false or contrary to
the truth. The same rule applies to other reliable channels of
information. This issue has a bearing upon many other issues of the
kind, and on it are based replies to many doubts and criticisms. The
reader should understand it well.
Limiting the
Jurisdiction of the Qur'an by Khabar al-Wahid:
When the credibility
of khabar al-wahid has been established by a definite proof (dalil
qati), is it possible to limit the jurisdiction of the general
statements of the Holy Qur'an by a khabar al-wahid? The
prevalent (mashhur) view among the scholars considers it valid.
A group of Sunni scholars opposes this view, and some of them reject it
unconditionally. `Isa ibn Aban states: "If a general statement of the
Qur'an has already been limited by a definite proof, it is valid to
further limit it by a khabar al-wahid; otherwise it is not
valid." Al-Karkhi states: "If the Book's general statement has been
limited by a separate proof (dalil munfasil) it is valid to limit
it further by a khabar al-wahid and not otherwise." Al-Qadi Abu
Bakr has refrained from giving an opinion in this regard.
[3]
We accept the
prevalent view, and the ground for doing so is, the khabar al-wahid
as presumed enjoys definite credibility, and this implies
that it is wajib to act according to it as long as there is no
hindrance to doing so.
Doubts and
Opinions:
The imagined
hindrance to acting in accordance with khabar al wahid is not
based on valid reasons. Some main objections and the replies to them are
mentioned below.
1.
It is argued that the Holy Qur'an is the word of God Almighty which has
been revealed to His Noble Prophet (S); this is a definite fact and
beyond doubt. However, a khabar al-wahid has no certainty of
being in accordance with the truth, nor is there a guarantee of its
contents being the authentic word of the Ma'sum, because there is at
least a possibility of the narrator's mistake. In the light of this, it
is not reasonable to abandon a thing which is certain for a proof
containing a possibility of error.
The reply to this is
that although the authenticity of the Qur'an is definite, it is not
certain whether its general statements represent the actual law. It is
obligatory to act in accordance with the general statements because they
are the literal meanings, and it is accepted as a reasonable practice
not disapproved by the Lawgiver to follow literal imports. It is quite
obvious that this common practice, which proves the authority of literal
meanings, is limited to cases where there exists no indication (qarinah)
contrary to the literal import, irrespective of whether the
indication is attached (muttasil) to the general statement or is
separate (munfasil) from it. Therefore, when there is an
indication conflicting with the literal import, it is obligatory to
forgo the literal meaning and to act in accordance with the indication.
Hence there is no other alternative to limiting the general statements
of the Qur'an by khabar al-wahid after a definite proof of its
credibility. It means that the khabar al-wahid has originated
from the Ma'sum, though its authenticity is based on ta`abbud
and not on fact. In other words, we may say, though the authenticity of
the Qur'an is certain, we have only presumption regarding its real
intent, and there is no reasonable impediment to forgoing a proof which
gives presumption for another similar proof whose credibility is known
for certain.
2.
It is argued that authentic traditions of the Ma'sumun (A) command us
to compare the traditions with the Qur'an, and that those which oppose
it should be discarded and not considered their word. A limiting
tradition (al-khabar al-khass) conflicting with a general
statement of the Qur'an comes within the purview of such traditions;
thus it becomes obligatory to discard it as unauthentic.
The reply to this is
that, first, we should clarify the meaning of `contradiction' and
`opposition.' Customary indications applied in comprehending the intent
of the Qur'an are not considered by custom as opposing the Qur'an in any
manner, and a limiting proof (al-dalil al khass) is an
indication which elucidates the intent of a general proof. Two
statements contradict each other when people are unable to understand
from them the intent of their speaker if both the statements come from
him. On this basis, a limiting khabar al-wahid cannot be
considered as contradicting a general statement of the Qur'an; rather,
it elucidates its intent.
This is also further
confirmed by our knowledge that a large number of traditions have been
issued by the Ma'sumun (A) that limit the general statements of the
Qur'an. Now, should this limiting be considered as contradiction to the
Qur'an, the following words of the Ma'sumun (A) will be incorrect:
That which opposes
the word of our Lord, has not been said by us. It is absurd or false.
This statement of
them (A) proves that the limiting of the jurisdiction of the general
statements of the Qur'an does not involve any contradiction.
Furthermore, the
Ma'sumun (A) have laid down agreement with the Qur'an of one of two
contradicting traditions as a criterion for preferring one of them to
the other. This implies, that a tradition which is not in consonance
with the literal general statements of the Qur'an is creditable in
itself, for it is obvious that if this tradition were opposed to the
Qur'an in a manner that reconciliation were impossible, it would fail to
be credible in itself, and thereby leave no room for conflict and
preference. Therefore, there is no alternative to accepting that the
meaning of a tradition's not being in consonance with the Qur'an is
that it is possible to reconcile the two in an acceptable manner by
limiting the general Qur'anic statements.
The conclusion is
that a tradition limiting the general Qur'anic statements is in itself
credible and it is necessary to act in accordance with it, except when
it is faced with another tradition contradicting it.
3.
It is argued that if it is valid to limit Qur'anic statements with
khabar al-wahid, it will also be valid to abrogate the Qur'an with
it. But since to do so is certainly not valid, it follows that limiting
the Qur'anic statements with it is also invalid. The basis of such a
logical linkage is that abrogation (as explained in the chapter on
naskh) means limiting the Qur'anic statements with respect to a
specific period of time, which ends with the arrival of the abrogating
proof (al-dalil al nasikh). Consequently the abrogation of a
Qur'anic statement does not mean its actual annulment, but only a formal
extrinsic abolition. The limiting of the jurisdiction of general
Qur'anic laws in regard to the instances of its application is similar
to limiting it to a particular period, both being forms of limitation.
Therefore, if the first is valid, the second, too, would be valid.
The reply to this is
that the difference between the two forms of limitation is the presence
of, a definite consensus (al-'ijma` al-qati) prohibiting the
abrogation of general Qur'anic laws by khabar al-wahid and had it
not been for this ijma`, the abrogation of Qur'anic statements by
a trustworthy khabar al-wahid would have been as valid as the
limiting of the general jurisdiction of Qur'anic statements. We have
mentioned earlier that though the Qur'an enjoys definite authenticity of
source (qati al-sanad), its actual import is not known for
certain, and there is no impediment to forgoing it by accepting a
khabar al-wahid whose credibility is definitely known.
It is to be noted
that the above mentioned ijma` is not based on mere ta`abbud,
but rests on a rational basis. This is because some matters are such
that should they be true in external reality, they are bound to be
widely reported (mutawatir), and if a matter of great
significance is reported only by some, it is evidence of the falsity or
error of the report. The proofs in favour of the reliability of
khabar al-wahid do not apply to such reports. It is on this basis
that we said that a text is not proved to be a part of the Qur'an on the
basis of khabar al-wahid. For there is no doubt that the
abrogation of the Qur'an is not an affair limited to a particular group
of Muslims to the exclusion of others. Hence, had abrogation occurred, a
very large number of traditions (akhbar mutawatirah) would have
narrated it. Now, if a single tradition reports it, it will be the
proof of its falsity or error. With this exposition, the difference
between the limitation of the Qur'anic statements by khabar al-wahid
and the abrogation of them by such traditions becomes obvious, and
the logical linkage claimed between the two is thereby refuted.
Notes
[1].
The author has discussed in detail the issue of tahrif in this
book (al-Bayan fi tafsir al-Qur an) in the chapter "siyanat
al-Qur an min al-tahrif" pp. 197-285.
[2].
For the Sunni sources containing Hadith al-Thaqalayn, see:
Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, part iii, pp. 14, 17, 26, 59 from
Abu Said al-Khudri; iv, pp. 366, 371 from Zayd ibn Arqam; v, pp.
182, 189 from Zayd ibn Thabit. See also al-Darimi, Sunan, "kitab
fada'il al-Qur'an," ii, 431; al-Suyuti in al-Jami 'al-saghir,
from al Tabarani, from Zayd ibn Thabit, evaluates it as sahih ;
al-`Allamah al-Manawi, Sharh, ii, p.15; al-Hakim,
al-Mustadrak, iii, 109, from Zayd ibn Arqam, evaluates it
as sahih; al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, Kanz al-'ummal, "bab al-i'tisam
bi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah, " Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-`Uthmaniyyah, i,
253, 332. Others who have reported it are Muslim in his Sahih;
Abu Ya'la, al-Hafiz `Abd al-`Aziz ibn al-'Akhdar, and many others.
For a detailed study of its sources see Hamid Husayn al-Hindi,
`Abaqat al anwar.
[3].
Al-'Amidi, Usul al- 'ahkam, ii, 472. |